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This thesis examines the dynamic between medical perception and practice that mark the 
interactions between the state, the medical profession, and the public in early twentieth-
century Britain and Singapore. It is not only a socio-cultural history of the Great Flu of 
1918-1919 but also a narrative about how disease and medicine contribute to varying 
manifestations of power and control. Power and control are examined in three broad 
ways, through the lenses of evolving conceptions of disease, the expansion of Western 
scientific medicine, and the colonial encounter. The first approach looks at how notions 
of disease have developed in the Western imagination and their significance; the second 
explores how Western scientific medicine, its advocates, and its practitioners came to 
possess the level of prestige that they have today; the last theme, colonialism, bridges the 
beginning chapter on Britain with the Singapore-centred ones in the latter half of this 
thesis by exploring the interaction between British medical systems and those available in 
Singapore. The values and attitudes surrounding the control of disease gain additional 
meaning when refracted through the colonial experience because of how the imperial 
project is closely intertwined with sickness and health. In this way, disease and Western 
scientific medicine are not only historicised but also re-politicised in order to locate their 
significance within a phenomenon that has had extensive and deep-seated political, 
economic, socio-cultural, and ideological ramifications.  
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The predominance of Western scientific medicine today is a result of scientific, 
epistemological, professional, and institutional developments, especially from the 
nineteenth century onwards. The Western cognitive framework towards disease evolved 
from the classical focus on humoral theory to more modern ideas about contagion and 
germs, which were best understood and ameliorated by the state as well as university-
educated doctors and scientists. How did disease move from being about weather or bad 
air to becoming the province of tiny, unseen particles exacerbated by poor sanitation or 
poverty? This thesis seeks to investigate these developments in medical thought that 
occurred alongside changes in its practice, in order to explore how the state and 
established medical institutions came to be the arbiters of good health. As orthodox 
medicine hardened along institutional lines, the relationship between the providers and 
recipients of therapeutic care slowly transformed, and became increasingly imbued with 
notions of power, class, and race. These issues did not affect the West alone but had 
significant impact on Europe’s imperial possessions, as ideas about sickness and health 
were transported overseas. Another major concern is therefore the issue of how the 
globalisation of Western scientific medicine cannot be divorced from colonialism and its 
attendant programmes of control. 
 
 This thesis also explores the dynamic between perception and practice, and how 
ideas about sickness and health structure our actions and relations to others. As Charles 
Rosenberg wrote, our “ideas about the natural world” are related to the “social forms in 
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 which that knowledge is used, validated, and reproduced”.1 Rosenberg deeply believed 
that history demonstrates the power of ideas and their role in shaping (and potentially 
changing) our attitudes and our institutions.2 By contextualising disease within systemic 
ways of power creation and consolidation, whether through discourse, institutions, or 
imperialism, we become more cognisant about the values that constitute the relationships 
we have towards diseases, our bodies, the systems of medicine and health we inherit, and 
our lived environment. These relationships are far from static; they involve various 
groups of society that are invariably engaged with ideas as well as each other in varying 
levels of acceptance, resistance, and/or apathy. Thus, aside from highlighting the 
importance of the biological, this project also seeks to understand different conceptions 
of disease and how those mindsets are integral to the measures we take to secure good 
health.  
 
To illustrate the key themes and aims outlined above, this project focuses on the 
Great Flu of 1918-1919 in Britain and Singapore. Epidemics provide a “convenient and 
effective sampling device” for investigating socio-cultural values and practices because 
these aspects of society are thrown into relief during such periods of crisis.3 The Great 
Flu elucidates how people thought about disease and how they negotiated with various 
forms of power and control – be it institutional, intellectual, cultural, or social – which 
are embedded in the dynamic relationship between medical theory and praxis. As a 
disease whose severity is generally overlooked and yet continues to thwart our efforts to 
completely control it, influenza in its pandemic form is a particularly informative medical, 
socio-cultural, and historiographical case study. This outbreak contextualises the values 
                                                
1 Charles Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics and Other Studies in the History of Medicine, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 6. 
2 Naomi Rogers, “Explaining Everything: The Power and Perils of Reading Rosenberg”, Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 63, 4 (October 2008), pp. 432-433. 
3 Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics, p. 110. 
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 possessed by two societies by highlighting and destabilising the foundations of their 
expectations and actions towards sickness, medicine, and what it means to maintain good 
health. 
 
 In relating various aspects of medical developments, discourse, interactions, and 
policies to the issue of power, this thesis contributes to historiography in a few 
interrelated ways: by highlighting the importance of studying disease and medicine as 
fruitful and multifaceted indices to society; by adding to the lack of scholarship 
addressing the 1918 flu pandemic in Britain and Singapore; by re-framing the colonial 
encounter in a manner that eschews static relationships between metropole and 
periphery; and finally, to use medicine as an alternative and less-explored approach to 
Singaporean history. In this Introduction, the key themes and frameworks structuring 
this thesis are explored. These include the historiography of disease; the expression and 
containment of disease within various modalities of colonialism; and the Great Flu, both 
in terms of its pathology and its historiography. Finally, the methodology informing the 
approach of this thesis will be explained. Chapter One briefly surveys Western notions of 
medicine and disease to contextualise the history of influenza in Britain, and examines 
reactions to the 1918-1919 flu pandemic there. In Chapter Two, power relations between 
coloniser and colonised are explored through the meeting of different medical 
worldviews. Finally, Chapter Three draws on the findings in Chapter Two and examines 
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 A Historiography of Disease 
 
 
  When Hans Zinsser wrote in his landmark work, Rats, Lice and History, that 
“swords, lances, arrows, machine guns, and even high explosives have had less power 
over the fates of the nations than the typhus louse, the plague flea, and the yellow-fever 
mosquito”, he drew attention to the historical importance of the biological dimension.4 
To understand the conceptual underpinnings of this thesis, this section situates the 
history of disease and medicine within the field of environmental history and highlights 
the connections that have been drawn between history, sickness, and the environment. 
Landmark works in the historiography of disease such as Zinsser’s are examined in order 
to highlight some of the prominent ways in which disease has been analysed as an 
inextricable part of both our past and contemporary experience and, in so doing, 
demonstrate the impact of epidemics on various dimensions of society. 
 
 The history of disease is a relatively new historiographical development. It 
developed in the mid-twentieth century and may be viewed as a subfield of 
environmental history. Environmental history emerged from the environmentalist 
movements in America in the 1960s and 1970s, and is part of a “revisionist effort to 
make the discipline [of history] far more inclusive in its narratives than it has traditionally 
been”.5 Essentially, environmental history is about the interaction between humans and 
nature and the implications of that relationship. It seeks to investigate the ways in which 
nature has influenced human actions and the corresponding impact of those actions on 
the environment. The field combines a variety of disciplines such as history, 
anthropology, geography, biology, and ecology in order to look at the environment from 
a wider perspective. Joachim Radkau argues that environmental history should not be 
                                                
4 Hans Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History, (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers, 2008), p. 9. 
5 Donald Worster, “Appendix: Doing Environmental History” in The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern 
Environmental History, Donald Worster, Editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 290. 
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 appreciated merely as a subfield but as “an integral component of a histoire totale [such 
that] one gains a deeper appreciation for all the other elements that come into play in 
environmental conflicts”.6 As part of its revisionist and more inclusive nature, 
environmental history thus pushes the boundaries of history beyond the purview of the 
nation-state to consider the hitherto ignored, the local, the mundane, and the fact that 
the “primary, elementary connection between man and environment is established by the 
fact that the human being is a biological organism”.7 
 
 The history of disease and its sibling, the history of medicine, developed against 
this backdrop of relatively recent historiographical developments. The re-centring of the 
biological in the relationship between history and humankind had the effect of opening 
up many new possibilities for research. On the surface, it seems strange that the 
historical study of disease would be considered novel since illness has been such a 
constant feature in human history.8 However truistic this latter statement sounds, it 
should not be underestimated that historical study was focused around ‘Great Men’ and 
the nation-state since the eighteenth-century.9 It is only with postmodernism (and the 
term is used loosely here for brevity’s and argument’s sake) that the metanarratives of 
history are seriously questioned and more democratic, multicultural approaches to history 
are actively championed and practised.10 
 
                                                
6 Joachim Radkau, Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), p. 5. 
7 Radkau, Nature and Power, p. 6. 
8 Charles Rosenberg, “Framing Disease: Illness, Society, and History” in Framing Disease: Studies in Cultural 
History, Charles Rosenberg and Janet Golden, Editors, (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 
xxiii. 
9 While it is arguable that there are still historians who advocate ‘top-heavy’ kinds of histories and are 
resistant to ‘alternative’ histories, it is not within the scope of this thesis to engage in an in-depth 
historiographical debate on this issue here. 
10 Joyce Appleby et. al., “Telling the Truth about History” in The Postmodern History Reader, Keith Jenkins, 
Editor, (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 209-218.  
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 Despite the fact that sickness is an inescapable phenomenon, it is really only with 
Hans Zinsser’s groundbreaking Rats, Lice and History that the place of disease within 
history came to be seriously considered. Zinsser’s text is pioneering because it sounded 
the alarm bells against microbes in a pre-antibiotics era, foregrounded the profound 
impact of epidemic disease upon political and military events, and “anticipated the 
publication of such works as William McNeill’s Plagues and Peoples in 1976”.11 In the post-
Zinsserian world, we can no longer ignore how diseases have the innate ability to disrupt 
the socio-political, economic, and cultural, on top of the physiological, well-being of 
societies both ancient and modern. 
 
 By asking “why should a man look at the world through only one knot-hole?”, 
Zinsser paved the way for alternative approaches to the history of Man’s relation to 
diseases.12 In Plagues and Peoples, William McNeill surveyed the human experience with 
and reaction to disease by discussing the various far-reaching implications of what he 
terms the “confluence of [global] disease pools”. The complex ways in which diseases 
evolve from epidemic to endemic strains are enacted in the human world in the drama of 
our socio-historical, political, and cultural evolution. For example, by using the 
decimation of Amerindian populations during the Spanish conquest as the starting point 
of his inquiry, McNeill observes how the “lopsided effect of infectious disease upon 
Amerindian populations … offered a key to understanding the ease of the Spanish 
conquest of America – not only militarily, but culturally as well”. He foregrounds the 
importance of considering the psychological and cultural effects arising from the 
demographic fall-out that occurs whenever a new disease invades a population 
possessing no immunity to it. Specific ways of life, language, and knowledge – these are 
                                                
11 Gerald Weissmann, “Rats, Lice and Zinsser”, Accessed 31 October 2009  
<http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no03/04-1001.htm>; Gerald N. Grob, “Introduction to the 
Transaction Edition” in Rats, Lice and History, p. xx-xxi. 
12 Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History, p. 18. 
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 but some of the attendant consequences that come with the loss of life. Therefore, by 
historicising disease, we can see how disease was the catalyst that sparked a series of 
political, technological, economic, and socio-cultural changes that had a tremendous 
impact on the Amerindian people.13 
 
 The end and rise of certain civilisations or groups of people as a result of 
pestilence is a subject that has also been interestingly configured elsewhere. Alfred 
Crosby, for example, situates his hypothesis between and beyond two extreme attitudes 
towards European expansion – the colonial and the post-colonial stances – to suggest an 
alternative vision of the past that accounts for the present. Here, “ecological 
imperialism” (in the form of European germs, flora and fauna) is construed as the 
deciding factor enabling European technological, economic, and cultural expansion 
across the globe. Crosby deflates triumphalist Eurocentric rhetoric by arguing that 
“empires have to be built of commoner stuff than miracles”: without germs serving as 
the “shock troops”, Europeans would not have been able to pave the way for its 
“complicated economies and greater numbers” in these so-called “Neo-Europes”.14 
 
 One of the most important ideas that Zinsser, McNeill and Crosby raise is that 
the secondary consequences of particularly virulent epidemics are more far-reaching and 
disorganising than being a dip in population.15 Just as the Amerindians experienced great 
cultural loss, Crosby argues that with the arrival of the Europeans in New Zealand, the 
“vulnerability of the New Zealanders to infectious diseases was cultural, as well as 
immunological”. Maori conceptions of disease and medicine, predicated on magic, 
provided neither explanation nor cure in the face of widespread venereal disease and 
                                                
13 William McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 94, 10-11, 15, 20-21. 
14 Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe 900-1900, 2nd Ed., (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 7, 56, 280. 
15 Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History, p. 128. 
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 other lethal pathogens. It would not take a huge leap of imagination to envision how 
their disease experience was both culturally bewildering and psychologically devastating. 
Furthermore, given their practise of polygamy, sexual hospitality, and infanticide, Maori 
sexual and cultural mores rendered them particularly defenceless to the debilitating 
repercussions of sexually transmitted diseases on reproductive rates.16 Here, we see how 
disease and medicine are interwoven within a wider nexus of issues to do with culture, 
social relations, power, and perception. 
 
Disease and Empire: Perceptions and Structures of Development 
 
 
 There is perhaps no clearer manifestation of power and control than colonialism. 
Beyond just a historical exploration of the effects of disease and medicine on different 
spheres of society, this thesis is interested in using disease as a means of re-framing the 
colonial history of Singapore through the lens of Western scientific medicine. In Chapter 
Two, disease and medicine are not only historicised but also re-politicised in order to 
locate their significance within colonialism, a phenomenon with extensive and deep-
seated political, economic, socio-cultural, and ideological ramifications. While historians 
of disease like Crosby have pointed out that disease is a significant contributor to the 
success of European expansion, this biological determinism ignores the “Europeans’ 
capacity to devise structures of exploitation and control that would turn even 
environmentally hostile lands to their own advantage and profit”.17  
 
 The ways in which disease are cognised are far from neutral and are part of a 
complex process of socio-cultural negotiations. Rosenberg suggests, in his analysis of 
                                                
16 Crosby, Ecological Imperialism, pp. 231-232. 
17 David Arnold, “Introduction: Disease, Medicine and Empire” in Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, 
David Arnold, Editor, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 2. 
   
9 
 how ideas about disease are constructed and disseminated, that ‘disease’ is “not simply a 
less than optimum physiological state”: 
 
[Disease] is at once a biological event, a generation-specific 
repertoire of verbal constructs reflecting medicine’s 
intellectual and institutional history, an occasion of and 
potential legitimation for public policy, an aspect of social 
role and individual … identity, a sanction for cultural values, 
and a structuring element in doctor and patient interactions.18 
  
   
These negotiations gain an added dimension within the colonial context since 
imperialism was not just a set of economic or military phenomena but signified “a 
complex ideology which had widespread intellectual, cultural and technical expressions” 
as well.19 Within the imperial context, disease cannot be extricated from its relationship 
to Western perceptions of scientific medicine and health. 
 
 Colonialism highlights how medicine is an ideology as much as a practice since 
medicine in the imperial context views the relationships between humans and their 
environment in particular ways.20 That said, it is also important to pay attention to local 
reactions to colonial medicine and institutions and consider the nature of their 
interactions with these developments. Disease and medicine therefore become the 
catalyst and the framework through which perceptions on both sides of the colonial 
experience can be explored. In this way, Chapter Two examines the ideology and the 
“instrumentality” of disease and medicine in addition to what they reveal about the 
complex power relations – neither static nor uncontested – between the differing cultural 
systems that govern coloniser and colonised in Britain and Singapore and, in so doing, 
provide the backdrop to the study of the Great Flu in Singapore.21  
                                                
18 Rosenberg, “Framing Disease”, p. xiii. 
19 John Mackenzie, “General Editor’s Foreword” in Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, p. vi. 
20 Mackenzie, “General Editor’s Foreword”, p. vi. 
21 Arnold, “Introduction”, p. 2. 




Locating the Great Flu in Britain and Singapore 
 
 
 Now that we have established the broad frameworks to the approach of this 
thesis, we arrive at a study of specifics. The interest in the Great Flu is twofold: first, in 
its magnitude and second, in the apparent disjunction between its epidemiological and 
demographic impact and the cultural and historiographical amnesia surrounding this 
particular moment in time. As Crosby points out, although “no infection, no war, no 
famine … has ever killed so many in as short a period”, the Spanish Flu “has never 
inspired awe, not in 1918 and not since, not among the citizens of any particular land”.22  
 
 The dearth of scholarship on the Great Flu is globally mirrored in Britain and its 
colonies. As Niall Johnson points out, compared to other countries Britain has scant 
archival records on the pandemic. In his 2009 work, Mark Honigsbaum framed the 1918 
flu in Britain as a “forgotten story”. If the history of disease in Southeast Asia is relatively 
untreated, in the case of the 1918 flu it is even more so. In 1988, David Arnold wrote 
that compared to other areas of the world such as Africa, scholarship on the impact of 
disease and medicine in Southeast Asia “remains relatively impoverished”. Ten years 
later, Lenore Manderson made the same observation: “there remains a vacuum in 
historical epidemiology, … the development of heath and medical services, … the 
ideological and pragmatic considerations which determined these [health] programmes, 
and their effects on people’s health”.23 
 
                                                
22 Alfred Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 311. 
23 Niall Johnson, “The Overshadowed Killer: Influenza in Britain in 1918-1919” in The Spanish Influenza 
Pandemic of 1918-19: New Perspectives, Howard Phillips and David Killingray, Editors, (London: Routledge, 
2003), p. 154; See Mark Honigsbaum, Living with Enza: The Forgotten Story of Britain and the Great Flu Pandemic 
of 1918, (New York: Macmillan, 2009); Arnold, “Introduction”, p. 1; Lenore Manderson, Sickness and the 
State: Health and Illness in Colonial Malaya, 1870-1940, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. xi. 
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 Given the magnitude of the death toll as a result of the Great Flu, it is surprising 
that it has largely remained a blind-spot for historians.24 This historiographical absence 
has slowly been addressed with texts such as William Beveridge’s Influenza: The Last Great 
Plague, Richard Collier’s Plague of the Spanish Lady, Geoffrey Rice’s Black November: The 
1918 Influenza Pandemic in New Zealand, Alfred Crosby’s America’s Forgotten Pandemic, 
Howard Phillips and David Killingray’s The Spanish Influenza Pandemic, and more recently, 
Niall Johnson’s Britain and the 1918-19 Influenza Pandemic and Mark Honigsbaum’s Living 
with Enza.25 
 
 While the international perspectives from Phillips and Killingray’s collection of 
essays combining historical and virological scholarship are instructive, they do not help 
the Southeast Asian case very much at all. Aside from what little has been written on 
Indonesia and the Philippines, there is no substantive literature on the Great Flu in the 
region. At the time of writing, there are only two articles covering the 1918 pandemic in 
Singapore from a historical angle: Liew Kai Khiun’s “Terribly Severe Though Mercifully 
Short” and “Twentieth Century Influenza Pandemics in Singapore” by Vernon J. Lee et 
al. Even then, Liew’s piece focuses more on Peninsular Malaya; the latter is short review 
article in which the 1957 and 1968 pandemics are covered in greater detail than the 1918 
one.26 One of the aims of this thesis, therefore, is to try and reconstruct a history of this 
particular experience from the perspective of a relatively neglected area of research. 
  
                                                
24 Howard Phillips and David Killingray, “Introduction” in The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919, p. 
13. 
25 See William Beveridge, Influenza: The Last Great Plague. An Unfinished Story of Discovery, (London: 
Heinemann, 1977); Richard Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady: The Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919, 
(London: Allison & Busby, 1996); Geoffrey Rice, Black November: The 1918 Influenza Pandemic in New 
Zealand, 2nd Ed., (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005); Niall Johnson, Britain and the 1918-19 
Influenza Pandemic: A Dark Epilogue, (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
26 Liew Kai Khiun, “Terribly Severe but Mercifully Short: The Episode of the 1918 Influenza in British 
Malaya”, Modern Asian Studies 41, 2 (2007), pp. 221-252; Lee, Vernon J. et. al. “The Twentieth Century 
Influenza Pandemics in Singapore”, Annals Academy of Medicine 37, 6 (June 2008), pp. 470-476. 
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 What is the 1918 flu and why was it so deadly? Also known as the Spanish Flu or 
the Great Flu, this pandemic killed at least thirty million people worldwide and, even at 
this conservative estimate, claimed three times the lives of those killed fighting in World 
War One.27 It was therefore, in the estimation of historians and virologists alike, “the 
single worst demographic disaster of the twentieth century”. It was called the Spanish Flu 
because the first reports of the outbreak were from Spain, where news reports were not 
censored during the war.28 It differentiated itself from previous pandemics in its singular 
propensity for pneumonic complications, while subscribing to the virus’ potential to 
exacerbate neurological conditions such as depression, mania, encephalitis lethargica, 
senile dementia, schizophrenia, as well as other sequelae such as lethargy and 
somnolence.29 
 
 Worldwide, it broke in three waves over 1918-1919 during the summer and 
autumn months, with the autumn wave in 1918 being the deadliest. In some places like 
Western Samoa, where 25 per cent of its population died of the flu, lives were lost in 
numbers so bewildering that we cannot begin to perceive the extent of the devastation. 
In England, Scotland, and Wales, more than 225,000 lives were lost in slightly under a 
year, with 64 per cent of deaths occurring during the autumn 1918 wave.30 In Singapore, 
the epidemic struck in two waves that coincided with global patterns: the June-July wave 
was milder, resulting in high morbidity but low mortality; October-November was more 
intense, with frequent pneumonia cases and high mortality rates. Unlike temperate 
countries, however, there was apparently no third wave in Singapore in 1919.31  
  
                                                
27 Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, p. xii. 
28 Phillips and Killingray, “Introduction”, pp. 3, 7. 
29 Johnson, Britain and the 1918-19 Influenza Pandemic, pp. 5-6. 
30 Johnson, “The Overshadowed Killer”, p. 132. 
31 Lee et. al., “The Twentieth Century Influenza Pandemics in Singapore”, p. 471. 
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 Despite late nineteenth-century advancements in epidemiological knowledge, 
scientists were unsure as to what caused influenza. While its unique symptomology 
fuelled uncertainty, its dreadful virulence enhanced the general sense of helplessness. In 
severe cases, death was especially graphic. Those who were hardest hit suffered from 
severe headaches, body pains, fever, cyanosis (the turning blue or black of the face), 
bleeding from the nose, and coughing blood. Bacterial invasion of the lungs caused the 
lung sacs to fill with fluid, which meant that victims effectively died by choking, gasping, 
and eventually drowning. Furthermore, death could come very suddenly and frequently – 
many reports cited people “suddenly collapsing and dying, or being taken ill and 
succumbing to the infection within a few hours”.32 Although epidemiologists have since 
become more well-informed, subsequent global pandemics in 1946, 1957, 1968-1970, 
1977, and 2009 clearly demonstrate that there are no silver bullets when it comes to 
influenza.33 Even in its non-pandemic forms, seasonal flu still kills between 250,000-
500,000 people per year worldwide.34 Clearly, the flu virus continues to challenge all our 
perceived advances in science, medicine, and public health.  
 
At once protean and relatively unchanging, the paradoxical nature of influenza 
makes it both remarkable and difficult for epidemiologists and historians. It is protean 
because influenza is, at its core, a notoriously changeable virus. If the main function of 
any virus is to replicate itself, influenza viruses are among the most “highly evolved, 
elegant in their focus, [and] more efficient at what they do than any fully living being”.35 
Yet influenza is also relatively unchanging because it produces, and has produced, 
through the ages, remarkably similar symptoms. Even though conceptions of medicine 
                                                
32 Phillips and Killingray, “Introduction”, p. 5. 
33 Johnson, Britain and the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic, p. 15. 
34 World Health Organisation, “Fact Sheet No. 211 – Influenza”, Accessed 5 August 2010. 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs211/en/.  
35 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in History, (New York: Penguin, 2004), 
p. 100. 
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 and disease have changed, influenza is one of the few conditions that “appear 
consistently throughout this evolution of nosologies as it has long been recognised, even 
if its cause was unknown”.36 By virtue of its pathology, influenza was recognised as 
something that “appears to correspond with something broadly the same in human life at 
all times”.37 And yet, in spite of its recurrence, flu outbreaks remain quite intractable for 
historians because of the way they spread explosively and dissipate almost as suddenly as 
they appear. Therefore, while one would expect such a terrible pandemic to be seared in 
the individual and public consciousness, the Spanish Flu is now little more than a folk 
memory whose frightening details seem to have been generally erased from society’s 
collective remembrance.38  
 
 
Methodology of Thesis 
 
 
 In discussing issues of power and control especially as they relate to medicine, 
ideas, structures, and colonialism, it seems natural that Michel Foucault’s The Birth of the 
Clinic, as well as Edward Said’s Orientalism, come to mind. The keystones of these 
treatises, however, while implicitly acknowledged, do not overtly frame the overall 
argument. This lack of centrality is by no means a comment on the importance of these 
texts; rather, my main aims are chiefly socio-cultural rather than theoretical or 
philosophical, and are not concerned with invoking a particular Foucauldian or Saidian 
response. Three main principles guide the methodology of this research project. The first 
is the concept of medicine as something inherently social and greatly bound by ideas. In 
terms of this approach, the chief influences are the medical historians Roy Porter and 
                                                
36 Johnson, Britain and the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic, p. 18. 
37 Charles Creighton, A History of Epidemics in Britain, 2nd Ed., Vol. II, (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1965), p. 
399. 
38 Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady, pp. 303-304. 
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 Charles Rosenberg, whose texts provide lucid and sophisticated articulations on how 
medicine and disease are necessarily social concepts, programmes, and systems.39 
 
 The second principle also takes its cue from Porter and Rosenberg, with the 
reminder to write histories which include the layperson and the educated public who are 
important parts of the complex medical dynamic, and to eschew histories that 
caricaturise the shortcomings or oversimplify the successes of Western scientific 
medicine.40 The works of James Warren, whose Ah Ku and Karayuki-San and Rickshaw 
Coolie have greatly enriched approaches to narrating Singapore’s past, also inform the 
emphasis on the complexity of lay-elite relations, highlighting stories from the voiceless 
members of society via an unconventional appraisal of historical sources. The third 
influence for the approach of this thesis draws from the microhistories of Natalie Zemon 
Davis and Carlo Ginzburg, whose works dare us to “[construct] a historiography capable 
of organizing and explaining the world of the past” in novel and challenging ways.41 
 
 In this thesis, two societies’ experience of this appalling episode are pieced 
together based on secondary scholarship and primary records – both substantial and 
ephemeral – found in newspapers, advertisements, as well as official reports, medical 
tracts, fiction, diaries, and letters from the governmental, intellectual, medical, and public 
spheres which invoke disease, medicine, influenza, and the Great Flu. Terence Ranger 
argues that the brevity of the 1918 flu pandemic poses difficulties for historians; such an 
abbreviated event needs a “lateral, descriptive” and imaginative approach rather than a 
                                                
39 Roy Porter, “Introduction” in The Cambridge History of Medicine, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), Roy Porter, Editor, pp. 1-9; Roy Porter, Disease, Medicine and Society in England 1550-1860, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987); Rosenberg, “Framing Disease”, pp. xiii-xxvi; Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics, p. 31. 
40 These issues are discussed in Porter, “Introduction”, pp. 8-9; Roy Porter, “The Patient’s View: Doing 
Medical History from Below”, Theory and Society 14 (1985), pp. 175-198; Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics, p. 
31. 
41 Giovanni Levi, “On Microhistory” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Peter Burke, Editor, 
(Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), p. 99. 
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 “conventional, vertical historical” narrative.42 By striving to understand the historical 
relationship between idea and action, elite and ordinary, collective and individual, I hope 
to construct a more “lateral” narrative that this particular pandemic so advocates. 





                                                
42 Terence Ranger, “A Historian’s Forward” in The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919: New Perspectives, 
p. xx. 










An Evolution of Ideas 
 
 
 The central premise of this thesis holds that medicine is both cognition and 
behaviour.1 As a social product, medicine is constantly “remaking itself, demolishing old 
dogmas, building on the past, forging new perspectives, and redefining its goals”.2 In 
Western history, the development of medical ideas translates into evolving expressions of 
power and control. In this chapter, we investigate the relationship between ideas of 
disease and the experience of the Great Flu alongside the ecological, social, and 
intellectual changes in Western European society. The first section contextualises the 
reactions to the 1918 flu by looking at how theories of disease causation evolved 
alongside the rise of the medical profession. This general survey narrows its focus in the 
following sections, where the various conceptualisations of influenza are discussed and 
the experience of the 1918 flu pandemic in Britain is specifically addressed.  
 
 In modern English usage, ‘disease’ has come to signify something objective that 
is activated by a pathogen and accompanied by certain telltale symptoms. Its historical 
transformation from more subjective notions of ‘dis-ease’ – a state of being ill at ease or 
discomfort – began when Western medicine began fashioning itself as a rational 
discipline based on empirics and science. The foundations of scientific medicine in the 
West lay in classical Greece with the Hippocratic tradition, which denied supernatural 
                                                
1 Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics, p. 4. 
2 Porter, “Introduction”, p. 9. 
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 causations of disease and focused on the body.3 Although the medical landscape was 
fluid and marked by a diversity of ideas and therapeutic options, the establishment of 
medicine as a university subject beginning in the Middle Ages and culminating in the 
nineteenth century meant that practitioners slowly acquired and projected the authority 
to re-shape what disease entailed and what it meant to be sick. New germ theories of 
disease and the advantages of laboratory science and technology allowed Western 
medicine to make important leaps after 1865. In this way, medicine gradually came to be 
seen as the domain of doctors and surgeons, and defined as something “over and beyond 
mere healing, as the possession of a specific body of learning, theoretical and practical, 
that might be used to treat the sick”.4  
 
 In the unfolding context of the shift from dis-ease to disease, doctors 
increasingly saw themselves as the heirs to the rarefied knowledge of medical science, as 
beneficiaries to state and institutional support, and, above all, to a vision of progress. 
Even with the new science they harnessed, however, there was very little doctors could 
do about infections and curing diseases on a wide scale until the invention of penicillin in 
1941. For roughly two thousand years, from the first century BCE and well into the mid-
nineteenth century, the main weapon in a doctor’s arsenal was bloodletting, either 
through the lancing of a vein, cupping or leaching.5 Furthermore, while scientific 
developments in medical theory changed explanations of how the human body worked, 
classical ideas of humoral imbalance and displacement were far from rejected.6 As long as 
the bodily humors were in equilibrium, good health and life could be sustained by 
                                                
3 Porter, “What is Disease?” in The Cambridge History of Medicine, pp. 72, 79. 
4 Vivian Nutton, “The Rise of Medicine” in The Cambridge History of Medicine, p. 47. 
5 David Wootton, Bad Medicine: Doctors Doing Harm Since Hippocrates, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 12, 2. 
6 Guenter B. Risse, “History of Western Medicine from Hippocrates to Germ Theory” in The Cambridge 
World History of Human Disease, Kenneth Kiple, Editor, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 
15. 
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 managing one’s diet, way of life, or environment. This classical mindset of “healthy 
minds promote healthy bodies” would prove enduring: victims of the Great Flu were 
urged to “keep a stout heart”, “don’t expect to fall sick”, and to keep a healthy diet and 
lifestyle.7  
 
The glorification of reason and science after the Scientific Revolution also did 
not prompt the laity and the profession to forsake traditional medical interest in the 
environment; neither did people stop seeing illness as a form of divine intervention. 
Epidemics stemmed from “an occult malignity, malevolence of the stars, [or] anger of 
the gods” or were “fathered on inconceivable and inexplicable qualities of the air, 
insensible and unintelligible miasmata or effluvia from the earth”.8 Even in the 
nineteenth century, the horrors of cholera signified divine vengeance as much as plague 
did for many people six centuries ago – the key difference between the two periods was 
that by the 1800s, science and the state had claimed and installed greater forms of 
explanation and control.9 The point is that while mindsets evolve, ideas rooted in time 
and culture can have remarkable staying power. When a new wave of influenza hit 
Britain in December 1918, observers noted that the spike in mortality rates coincided 
“curiously enough, just after the wind veered from east to west and hot, damp weather 
succeeded to the cold, dry spell”. Warm and humid weather could lower one’s resistance, 
cause depression, and render one “less able to ward off the danger threatening him”.10 
Weather, meteorology, and the environment were still very much part of the Western 
cognitive framework towards disease. In other words, any assessment of the Great Flu 
                                                
7 Porter, “What is Disease?”, pp. 79-80; The Times (henceforth TT), 1 November 1918, p. 7. 
8 Thomas Short, A General Chronological History of the Air, Seasons, Weather, Meteors, Etc., in Sundry Places and 
Different Times; More Particularly for Space of 250 Years, (London: T. Longman & A. Miller, 1749), pp. ii, v. 
9 J. N. Hays, The Burdens of Disease: Epidemics and Human Response in Western History, (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1998), p. 130. 
10 TT, 3 December 1918, p. 5. 
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 has to take into account how classical or folk conceptions of disease are far-reaching, 
despite elitist pronouncements about sickness that were centred on science. 
 
 
What’s in a Name? Influenza Outbreaks, Ideas, and Nomenclature. 
 
 
Where did influenza come from, how did people think about, remember, and 
forget it? Even as it came to be dismissed as trivial, why were some grandmothers still 
“wont to dignify their more severe seasonal catarrhs by speaking of them as influenza 
colds” even though influenza had become for most doctors “less than a memory, almost 
a myth”?11 Influenza had many precursors that continued to have resonance in the 
imagination of Western Europeans, and that the changing conceptions of influenza – its 
meanings and its names – reveals the impulse to pin down a disease that is particularly 
good at eluding any “simple theory of its nature or a neat formula for its cause”.12 This 
impulse also points to the “increasingly aggressive empiricism” of the early nineteenth-
century, where people saw the need to evaluate every aspect of medicine or clinical 
practice.13 In this section, we will look at the historical conceptualisations of influenza in 
Europe. By historicising attitudes and actions toward sickness in general and influenza in 
particular, it is hoped that reactions to the pandemic can be thrown into relief and better 
understood. 
 
Although the origins of influenza are unknown, Crosby writes that the illness has 
been “our unfailing companion” ever since the Middle Ages and became endemic in 
most countries in the world by the 1800s. He suggests that Livy and the Hippocratic 
writers in 412 BCE referenced an influenza-like disease but there is no clear sign of its 
                                                
11 F. G. Crookshank, “The Name and Names of Influenza” in Influenza: Essays By Several Authors, F. G. 
Crookshank, Editor, (London: William Heinemann, 1922), p. 69. 
12 Creighton, A History of Epidemics in Britain, p. 398. 
13 Rosenberg, Explaining Epidemics, p. 11.  
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 spread among people until Europe’s Middle Ages and no irrefutable evidence until the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.14 In medieval times, philosophers, physicians, and 
monks used the word influentia as a rational and philosphical expression of “some agency 
or force, if not divine in origin, that was ultimately responsible for terrestrial pestilences 
and catastrophes”.15 Around 1504, the word developed, from ideas of astral or occult 
influence, notions of the visitation of any epidemic disease that attacked many people at 
the same time and place; Italians called these outbreaks influenza di catarro or influenza di 
febbre scarlattina.16 The English and Americans assigned the names ‘the gentle correction’ 
and the ‘jolly rant’ to an illness that closely resembled influenza.17 The French gave their 
epidemic spells of influenza many names – la baraquette, l’allure, la généralle, and la grippe 
were appellations in vogue in the eighteenth century.18  
 
Coqueluche, meaning cap, bonnet, monastic hood, or vanity bag at different times 
in French history, is one example of how the meaning of influenza has been debated and 
perpetuated in the medico-intellectual history of influenza.19 In the eighteenth-century, 
British country clergyman Thomas Short wrote of an epidemic in 1510 that “raged all 
over Europe” and attributed it to a disease known as coccoluche or coccolucio in Italy, so-
called because “the sick wore a cap or covering clothe all over their heads” as a form of 
cure.20 As the outbreak bore all the hallmarks of influenza, other scholars picked up on 
Short’s findings and perpetuated it in their respective medico-historical records. 
Although Crookshank dismisses the connections made between coccoluche and influenza 
as “absurd legends … resting on no better foundation than the industrious, dull, and 
                                                
14 Alfred Crosby, “Influenza” in The Cambridge World History of Human Disease, pp. 809, 808. 
15 Crookshank, “The Name and Names of Influenza”, p. 65. 
16 "Influenza, n." The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed., 1989, OED Online. Oxford University Press. 
Accessed 16 July 2010 <http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50116455>. 
17 Tom Quinn, Flu: A Social History of Influenza, (London: New Holland Publishers, 2008), p. 39. 
18 Crookshank, “The Name and Names of Influenza”, p. 71. 
19 Crookshank, “The Name and Names of Influenza”, pp. 72-73. 
20 Short, A General Chronological History, p. 204. 
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 absolutely untrustworthy Dr. Thomas Short”, excerpts of Short’s work were given 
prominence in the Annals of Influenza by Theophilus Thompson and survived into the 
text’s second edition, published in 1890.21 Short’s work is also referenced in other oft-
cited texts on influenza such as Warren T. Vaughan’s Influenza: An Epidemiological Study, 
which was printed in 1921.22 Of course, a large part of the disagreement is attributable to 
the unclear origins and understanding of influenza before the 1930s. Regardless of the 
accuracy of Short’s scholarship, however, it is clear that his findings were part of a 
dynamic discourse on influenza from the eighteenth century onwards, thereby 
demonstrating how historians, doctors, and epidemiologists are continually trying to 
come to terms with this paradoxical and protean disease. 
 
Influenza nomenclature was also coloured by spatial, political, and geographical 
associations. As influenza pandemics struck so widely and so quickly, people felt that 
such awesome phenomena could only be attributable to the influence of heavenly bodies, 
or in the form of miasmas (ill winds) blowing from elsewhere, or arising from 
earthquakes and the “effluvia from the earth”.23 When astral and miasmatic theories 
would not suffice, politico-geographical forms of rationalisation were employed.  
Crookshank even declared: “no epidemic disease has been described so frequently, in 
respect of particular prevalences, to neighbouring or antipathic regions as influenza”.24 
By believing that influenza proliferated via miasma or earthquakes, people could 
rationalise why the flu could hit so many living so far apart at the same time. By 
                                                
21 See Theophilus Thompson, Annals of Influenza or Epidemic Catarrhal Fever in Great Britain from 1510-1837, 
(London: C. & J. Adlard, 1852) and E. Symes Thompson, Influenza or Epidemic Catarrhal Fever: An Historical 
Survey of Past Epidemics in Great Britain from 1510 to 1890, (London: Percival & Co., 1890). 
22 Warren T. Vaughan, “Influenza: An Epidemiological Study”, The American Journal of Hygiene No. 1, July 
1921, (Lancaster, PA: The New Era Printing Company, 1921), p. 4. 
23 Short, A General Chronological History, pp. v, 204. 
24 Crookshank, “The Name and Names of Influenza”, p. 70. 
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 associating outbreaks of flu with other regions or countries, people could displace their 
fears and culpability on foreign persons and spaces.  
 
Flu epidemics and pandemics were therefore dubbed, rightly or wrongly, 
according to who was doing the naming and where the outbreak seemed to originate. 
Whether it was the Spanish or Italian Catarrh depended on whether it was the Spanish, 
Italian, or French who was doing the referring; the Chinese called their visitations the 
Russian or Japanese flu; the Russians called theirs the Chinese Fever; the Germans and 
the Dutch had their fair share of finger-pointing at each other; and the pandemic of 
1889-1890 was known to Germans, Italians, French, and English (and is still known to us 
today) as the Russian Flu.25 As one newspaper article wrote, the 1889-1890 outbreak was 
“imaginatively defined” as the Russian influenza because “in those far-off days Russia 
was a land of melodramatic mysteries for most of us, and, therefore, the likeliest place of 
a swift and strange disease, ‘the ghost of the Plague’”.26 
 
Our pandemic in question was called the Spanish Flu by virtue of looser wartime 
censorship rather than actual origins. Some opined that it was no wonder Spain should 
have an epidemic during the spring of 1918: the dry, windy Spanish spring was an 
“unpleasant and unhealthy season at all times” as it propagated the disease by filling the 
air with “microbe-laden dust”. There was even popular speculation of espionage and 
biological warfare: “pro-German influence” in the form of an “unseen hand” carrying 
test-tubes “containing cultures of all the bacilli known to science, and many as yet 
unknown”.27 Hence, we can see how influenza and its many appellations display cultural 
                                                
25 Crookshank, “The Name and Names of Influenza”, p. 71. 
26 TT, 25 June 1918, p. 9. 
27 TT, 25 June 1918, p. 9. 
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 values and biases – played up by wartime politics – and the manner in which people 
organise the unknown and uncontrollable. 
 
The idea of what constituted and caused influenza also varied according to the 
intellectual biases of the time. For instance, when the doctrine of contagiousness was out 
of favour, Charles Creighton believed that the flu was spread by miasma.28 Others, like 
Rollo Russell, held on to the contagion theory, judging that influenza was “beyond all 
question communicated by infected persons and things” as opposed to “atmospheric 
agency”.29 Unlike Crookshank and Creighton, August Hirsch saw influenza as an 
important, widespread, and infectious disease independent of weather and other cosmic 
causations. As Crookshank points out, Hirsch’s postulations would make a significant 
impact on nineteenth- and early twentieth-century epidemiological studies.30 
 
In sum, it is clear that the intellectual and cultural history of influenza is rich and 
has evolved in significant ways through the centuries. The meanings and ideas 
underpinning influenza were far from univocal – they were subject to contestation, and 
have been so for a long time. As we shall see in the following section, this lack of 
consensus would rage in the medical literature and the newspapers for as long as the 
1918-1919 pandemic continued to claim its victims. Indeed, the various ways in which 
influenza were to be understood were still very much in discussion in the aftermath of 
the Great Flu itself. 
 
 
                                                
28 Beveridge, Influenza, p. 2. 
29 Rollo Russell, Epidemics, Plagues and Fevers: Their Causes and Prevention, (London: Edward Stanford, 1892), 
p. 194. 
30 August Hirsch, Handbook of Geographical and Historical Pathology, 2nd Ed., Charles Creighton, Trans., 
(London, New Sydenham Society, 1883), p. 7, quoted in Johnson, Britain and the 1918-19 Influenza Pandemic, 
p. 16; F. G. Crookshank, “Some Historical Conceptions of Influenza” in Influenza: Essays By Several Authors, 
pp. 52-53. 
   
25 
 A War on All Fronts: State and Public Reactions 
 
 
The Great Flu of 1918-1919 challenged the limits of British society on multiple 
fronts, at the level of the state, the public, and the profession. An exploration of 
contemporary letters, oral history, medical tracts, and The Times articles from 1918-1919 
reveal prejudices about the flu as well as a society that refracted, through the epidemic 
experience, broader issues to do with the medical profession, the role of public health, 
and the nation’s vitality. Faced with the inertia of a central administration that was too 
preoccupied with war, local medical workers and the general public struggled with a 
combination of wartime privations, medical shortages, economic disturbances, strained 
social services, and a medical profession that was unable to provide definite answers but 
nonetheless remained steadfast in its ability to eventually do so. And all the while, the 
influenza epidemic made its rounds, claimed its quarry, and mercilessly eluded all control.  
 
Two factors greatly influenced state and public reactions to the pandemic: 
prevailing attitudes towards influenza and the overshadowing importance of the Great 
War. When Wilfred Owen wrote to his mother in June 1918, he sarcastically told her to 
“STAND BACK FROM THE PAGE!” and disinfect herself because about a third of his 
battalion and thirty officers had succumbed to the Spanish Flu. Although “the boys 
[were] dropping on parade like flies”, Owen was not afraid because he was “quite 
immune”; besides, influenza was “much too common for [him] to take part in”. After all, 
how could a “dry, grim, sardonic” flu that produced a stabbing pain in the eyeballs 
compare to sufferers of cholera who wasted away by dehydration, vomiting, and 
“profuse, uncontrollable excretion”?31 
 
                                                
31 Wilfred Owen, Wilfred Owen: Collected Letters, Harold Owen and John Bell, Editors, (London: Oxford 
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 In 1918, the man on the street in Britain was more concerned with foreign affairs 
and the Great War rather than any prospect of a Great Plague, least of all from a mere 
bout of flu. The arrival of the epidemic, by then already spreading rapidly through Spain 
and the war camps, was not feared but “cheerfully anticipated”.32 This initial optimism 
would be sorely checked by October: during the terrible autumn wave, The Times took to 
highlighting society’s short-term memory when it comes to influenza: 
 
During the last few years influenza was in one of its non-
virulent periods, and was treated lightly, the bitter experiences 
of the epidemics of the eighties being more or less forgotten. 
Now the old virulence has shown itself again.33 
 
 
The “old virulence” that influenza is capable of unleashing claimed around 
225,000 lives in Britain, mostly within a few weeks in the autumn of 1918 – a magnitude 
that officials recognised “far surpassed anything previously experienced”.34 In the face of 
such superlative claims, what position did the central government take? While influenza 
claimed its victims by the thousands, the government did not seem inclined to do very 
much. The attitudes towards the flu espoused by Wilfred Owen certainly coincided with 
Whitehall. As Richard Collier points out, the widespread treatment of influenza as an 
unimportant disease can be seen in the way it was not made a notifiable disease, despite 
the high death toll of the 1890 flu pandemic. As early as July, Arthur Newsholme, Chief 
Medical Officer of the Local Government Board (LGB), the leading public health body 
in Britain at the time, was alerted by his advisors and anticipated an epidemic. In 
response to such concerns, he drew up a memorandum to local authorities across Britain 
but amazingly, did not act on it. Britain’s Medical Research Council, which also predicted 
in August that a serious epidemic would occur by autumn, did not carry enough financial 
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 or political clout to rouse the central government from their inaction. In response to the 
Council’s warnings and calls for bacteriological research, the higher echelons of the 
Army replied: “Damn research, sir – we’ve got to get on with the war”.35  
 
At the height of the autumn wave, Newsholme declared that “the control over 
the disease can be secured only by the active cooperation of each member of the 
community”.36 The LGB itself, however, was marked by extraordinary inertia. Sandra 
Tomkins argues that some countries were able to mount successful responses focused on 
minimising social distress when authorities eventually acknowledged that influenza could 
neither be contained nor vaccinated into non-existence. In America and the British 
Dominions, even though there was little central organisation, authorities cobbled aid 
together in the form of emergency hospitals, dispensaries, and home nursing care to deal 
with secondary complications in sufferers; soup kitchens and home help programmes to 
cope with the high rate of morbidity; and emergency burial services to relieve the 
accumulation of corpses. This was in marked contrast to the efforts (or lack thereof) of 
the LGB, whose actions were based on a preventive policy that included issuing advice 
and regulating cinemas.37 The control of cinemas involved limiting the duration of 
performances and imposing ventilation practices. These absurd measures, scholars argue, 
were really an issue of class values more than containment: they reflected “anti-vice 
concerns regarding the perceived immorality of the cinema” and the medical elite’s 
disdain for mass entertainment rather than sincere concerns for public health.38  
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37 Sandra Tomkins, “The Failure of Expertise: Public Health Policy in Britain during the 1918-19 Influenza 
Epidemic”, Social History of Medicine 5 (1992), p. 443. 
38 Tomkins, “The Failure of Expertise”, p. 443; Johnson, Britain and the 1918-19 Influenza Pandemic, p. 127. 
   
28 
 LGB advice came in the form of a nine-page Memorandum on Epidemic Catarrhs and 
Influenza that was distributed to local authorities only on 22 October and in early 
November 1918. Apart from issuing the sporadic ‘Memorandum’ and distributing a 
fifteen-minute film in mid-December called Dr Wise on Influenza to advise the public on 
how to avoid and treat influenza, the LGB generally left local authorities and their 
Medical Officers of Health (MOHs) to figure things out on their own.39 It is not without 
historical precedence that the LGB left much of the work to local authorities. Infectious 
disease tended to be seen as a local problem and therefore to be dealt with by authorities 
at the local level.40 However, it was clear to the public that much more ought to be done 
and the newspapers did not spare any chance for criticism. One day after the release of 
the Memorandum, the Editor of The Times censured the LGB for doing too little too late: 
 
Yesterday the Local Government Board issued to the public a 
memorandum of advice, which is being circulated among 
local authorities, the object being, apparently, to prevent a 
further spread of the disease. It would have been better to 
lock the stable door before the escape of the horse. If this 
advice is likely to have any good effect, its chances of 
achieving its purpose would have been enhanced had it been 




The call for more resolute measures, in view of the spike in the number of cases 
in October, however, ran counter to the LGB’s plans. Since a substantial proportion of 
all medical personnel were involved in the war effort, demands for medical assistance 
were only more readily granted after the conflict ended.42 Newsholme resisted national 
maritime and local quarantine measures, arguing that the nation’s “major duty is to ‘carry 
on’ … [It] was necessary to ‘carry on’ [because] the relentless needs of warfare justified 
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 incurring [the] risk of spreading infection and the associated creation of a more virulent 
type of disease or mixed diseases”.43 National and military interest thus superseded all 
other concerns and such attitudes prevailed well into the third wave in 1919. Faced with 
mounting deaths and official inertia, something had to give. The frustrations of the 
public could be glimpsed in one passing event: in the middle of March 1919, Frank 
Brady was charged with breaking two plate-glass windows in the Lord Mayor’s drawing-
room. When arrested, Brady claimed that he did it “as a protest against the influenza 
epidemic being allowed to prevail unchecked for three years”.44  
 
 In the face of such passivity, the beleaguered public had to cope accordingly. As 
the LGB left local authorities in charge, the level of support that each town or city had 
really depended on how competent their MOHs were. One example of medical and 
administrative proficiency was Dr. James Niven, the MOH for Manchester. Unlike many 
of his colleagues, Niven recognised both the medical danger and the need for non-
medical assistance.45 In the last week of November, there were 383 deaths in Manchester 
alone and burial would take about two weeks, assuming a coffin was available.46 To 
circumvent this issue, Niven encouraged people to do without elaborate burials and opt 
for cremation instead. Thankfully, they received the aid of a detachment of the Labour 
Corps of the Western Command of the Royal Army to dig graves, thus ameliorating the 
worst of the second wave. To ease public distress, the city Public Health Committee 
sought to deploy whatever limited resources they had to provide domestic help, 
especially when neighbours or family members were too ill or frightened to visit the sick. 
A remaining portion of donated coal from December 1916 was also shared among those 
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 who passed the required means test and additional aid in the form of milk, nursing, and 
whiskey was given to especially severe cases. But even with Niven’s management of the 
situation, Frank van Hartesveldt argues that Manchester still suffered on a scale 
comparable to the rest of Britain, and so were their expressions of frustration and fear.47 
 
 Across Great Britain, people had to manage with wartime privations on top of 
the harrowing scale of the Great Flu. At the local level, the people had to rely on 
philanthropy, volunteers, physicians, pharmacists, and other community support 
networks such as churches, neighbours, and relatives, alongside official initiatives to cope 
with food shortages, widespread absenteeism, and a great strain on medical and funeral 
services.48 Hospitals in some places were so overwhelmed that patients had to be turned 
away. In Abercarn and Mold, a large number of bakers were down with the flu, 
precipitating bread shortages.49 Farmers, already labouring under the depletion of skilled 
help due to the war, were also probably affected by the epidemic and contributed to the 
worrying food situation.50  
 
At a time when the Chief Medical Officer of the London County Council 
suggested that the disease was declining, one third of the London police force were on 
the sick list and entire hospitals sometimes had to be closed because their medical staff 
were bedbound with the flu.51 Nurses who risked exposure to the flu occasionally 
succumbed the way their patients did, and while some like Probationer-Nurse Michael of 
Glasgow and Nurse Evans of Camarthen died and were buried with full military 
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 honours, most went unrecorded or remain anonymous under the general phrases of 
“several deaths” or simply “nurses” who were attacked and died within hours.52 
 
Public transport and other day-to-day services were “only maintained with 
difficulty”; tram services were disrupted and absenteeism was so great among the 
London Telephone Service that the Postmaster-General had to urge the public to limit 
their calls. Woe betide Londoners whose premises caught fire in the last week of 
October because more than a hundred members of the London Fire Brigade were ill and 
the motor pump could not be turned out for fires because seven out of eleven men at 
the Hackney Fire Station were down with the flu.53 Most importantly, undertakers were 
so swamped that in some places like Enfield and Woolwich, firms had to refuse further 
funeral orders.54 In some luckier localities, extra labour for gravedigging could be sought 
from park gardeners or workmen from the borough council. In places that were less 
fortunate, on the other hand, the dead were left in houses, side by side with the living.55 
Such details exist as one or two lines in the newspapers but they help to suggest what the 
material and psychological conditions of life were at the time. Communities had to rally 
as best as they could, but the emotional impact of losing a loved one and to see corpses 
piling up without recourse must have been great indeed.  
 
The Spanish Flu could be especially virulent and inflicted many, but it did so 
unevenly and almost arbitrarily. Although the experience was undeniably harrowing, 
mortality rates were about 1 to 3 per cent of the total population and the majority of 
people who got the flu would survive.56 This unevenness would explain why it was a 
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 tragedy for some and a passing inconvenience for others. At the close of October 1918, 
Virginia Woolf provided an acerbic comment on the state of events in her diary: “We 
are, by the way, in the midst of a plague unmatched since the Black Death, according to 
the Times, who seem to tremble lest it may seize upon Lord Northcliffe, & thus 
precipitate us into peace”.57 Others like Dr. J. McOscar complained to the British Medical 
Journal: 
Are we not now going through enough dark days, with every 
man, woman, or child mourning over some relation, lost 
owing to one man’s aggrandisement? Yet we read in our daily 
newspapers the enormous fatalities due to the ‘influenza 
epidemic’. When epidemics occur, deaths always happen. 
Would it not be better if a little more prudence were shown 
in publishing such reports instead of banking up as many 
dark clouds as possible to upset our breakfasts? Some editors 
and correspondents seem to be badly needing a holiday, and 
the sooner they take it, the better for public morale.58 
 
 
McOscar’s grievances, while insensitive, are unsurprising when we consider that the most 
common and consistent advice given by the medical profession was to ignore the 
epidemic because fear and low morale itself invited infection.59 Hence, many in the 
profession felt that press coverage of the epidemic was unnecessary scaremongering. 
 
 For countless others, though, the Great Flu was a time of great personal tragedy. 
When William White was due to return from the Front, he had wanted to surprise his 
wife and so did not write her in advance. Upon arrival, however, he found her ill with the 
flu. Unfortunately, she passed away the following Monday. To make matters worse, their 
baby, only a little over a year old, was taken to the hospital on the same day and died on 
Tuesday, also from influenza.60 This juxtaposition of beginnings and endings is also 
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 starkly rendered in the case of two young women, active members of St. Paul’s 
churchyard, who died from influenza and were buried on what was supposed to be their 
respective wedding days. The swift scythe of influenza also found eighteen-year-old 
Susannah Jones, who passed away just one day after her wedding.61 In the case of crane-
driver James Shaw, the outcome was more gruesome. Shortly before midnight, Shaw slit 
his throat with a razor blade, but not before killing his two-year-old daughter, Edith 
Mary, and wounding his seven-year-old daughter, Lucy. There was no mention of a 
mother. Investigations imply that it was a case of suicide – Shaw had been unable to 
resume work at the docks after a severe attack of influenza.62 
 
It is possible that Shaw’s case represents an incident of mania and depression, 
neurological conditions that can be aggravated by influenza. Accounts of depression and 
malaise were reported during the pandemic.63 Moreover, studies of the Russian Flu of 
1890 suggest that there is a connection between that epidemic and a marked increase in 
suicide rates.64 It is probable that other similar cases of depression associated with both 
the symptomology of influenza and economic anxieties exist. These stories of personal 
loss exist alongside the numerous obituaries bearing “melancholy witness to the ravages 
of the great plague of influenza and pneumonia”. While the records are brief, they hold 
great importance at the individual level and endow statistics – a prominent feature 
scattered throughout many histories of disease – with meaning. For many, the Great Flu 
really did come “like a thief in the night and stole treasure”.65 
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 Influenza, Honigsbaum argues, has an “unusual, chameleon-like ability to take on 
the characteristics or ‘spirit’ of the age”. The Spanish Flu aggravated feelings of post-war 
malaise and uncertainty about peace and reconstruction.66 The pandemic certainly struck 
at a time when Britain was experiencing profound change and potentially intensified 
anxieties of a weakening race in a new century. Britain during the Victorian Age was the 
centre of the world. With the creation of the Greenwich Meridian, London was literally 
and symbolically the centre from whence time and all other places stretched east and 
west. It was simultaneously the workshop of and the financier to the world, a beacon of 
commerce, learning and science.67 Was it any wonder that Britain prided herself as the 
empire where the sun never sets? In many ways, however, the fin de siècle also represented 
the end of an era of unmitigated confidence, a sense that was compounded by the socio-
political and psychological changes wrought by the brutal Boer Wars and World War 
One itself.68 
 
Reflections on the outcomes and causes of the outbreak certainly suggest a 
gloomy outlook of a vulnerable nation anxious about its projected future. As the official 
Report of the pandemic stated, epidemic influenza was “largely an internal problem of 
each nation, a problem of social relationship, of social factors, of domestic habit and 
life”.69 When plotted on a graph, the usual curve for influenza and pneumonia is a crude 
U-shape, meaning that the young and old are the most susceptible. By contrast, when the 
curve is plotted for the incidence of age-related deaths pertaining to influenza and 
pneumonia in 1918, the resultant shape is a crude ‘W’, meaning that the spike of deaths 
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 range in the ages of 21-29.70 It would have been mentally and emotionally distressing for 
the nation as a whole to see so many fallen people at the peak of their lives. What was 
worse, Europe had just sent millions of its able-bodied young men into a world war. For 
many Britons, therefore, it was peculiarly tragic that a war which “gathered the flower of 
the world’s young manhood” would be followed by an epidemic “with a selective 
tendency for young adults, and … not the weak, but the strong, the fittest, the most 
promising”. It seemed evident then, that the future of the English nation now lay “with 
the middle-aged and the unfit”.71  
 
 
The Limits of Knowledge: The Medical Profession and The Great Flu  
 
 
At the time of the Great Flu, the British medical profession believed that their 
scientific theories and medical capabilities had made significant progress. Buoyed by 
discoveries during the Victorian age, most doctors held an emphatic belief in their ability 
to vanquish diseases like influenza with medical science. Improved understandings of 
disease causation expressed in new specialist vocabulary and equipment, successes with 
diphtheria and smallpox, and, above all, a confidence in new methodology, combined to 
distance professional medicine from the lay public.72 The 1918-1919 outbreak occurred 
during a time when the medical powers-that-be was striving to strengthen their 
dominance. Even though the pandemic confounded the medical profession’s efforts to 
deal with the causation and the fall-out of the disease, it did not shake, but perhaps even 
strengthened, the fundamental belief that Western preventive medicine was crucial in the 
eventual and inevitable triumph over adversity. 
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The British medical elite did not automatically command monopoly. As late as 
the early twentieth century, attitudes towards modern doctors and Western scientific 
medicine could be located within a continuum between two polarised ends: its most 
fervent supporters on the one hand and on the other sceptics, like George Bernard Shaw, 
who declared the medical service a “murderous absurdity” made up of infamous 
characters.73 Indeed, in the history of English medicine, Porter highlights that the 
“professional elite had more enemies than friends, and was indicted for being 
monopolistic and self-serving without offering correspondingly successful medical 
care”.74  
 
Despite criticism for being “formally straitjacketed” within a hierarchy of 
physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, medical care still grew rapidly from the 
eighteenth century in quantity and quality alongside a general increase in prosperity 
across most sectors of society.75 As standards of medicine improved and demand for 
healthcare services grew, the social position of medical practitioners rose as well. During 
the Victorian age, the British medical profession was consolidated via demarcated 
divisions of labour, established membership, and differentiations made between 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of medicine.76 However, although the Medical Act of 
1858 delineated the in-group from the fringe, the practice of non-registered doctors was 
not made illegal – Parliament was well aware that such legislation would prove extremely 
unpopular with the public and wholly impossible to enforce.77  
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 Whatever one’s position between the dichotomy of medical supporter or medical 
sceptic, it is nonetheless apparent that by 1918, the medical profession had instituted 
important changes and grown in dominance. While professional consolidation was a key 
change, it is also clear that British medical elites had to work to establish power because 
“lay medicine and client control of doctors remained widespread” well past the 1850s.78 
Furthermore, behind its legal unity the profession was characterised by variations in 
attitudes, goals, standards, as well as its evaluation of science.79 This multiplicity can be 
seen in the way the British medical profession was still in the process of establishing 
itself professionally and scientifically, while also undergoing segregation into scientific 
medicine and public health in the first decades of the twentieth century.80 In the face of 
such variegation, Tomkins argues that the 1918 flu actually produced a rare consensus, 
uniting hostile factions of the profession while it “subsumed the many inconsistencies 
over specific measures”.81 
 
Inconsistency certainly characterised the climate of medical thought surrounding 
the aetiology of influenza in 1918. Early twentieth-century bacteriologists did not possess 
the technology to see something as small as a virus; the possibility of properly identifying 
the root cause was therefore precluded from the outset. Harold Wittingham and Carrie 
Sims, for example, emphasised that influenza is a “compound disease”. They promoted 
the use of vaccines to “abolish or modify the toxic type of the disease” and argued that 
the ability to discern real influenza from other “pyrexias of sudden onset” was best left 
to the “professional mind”.82 Others believed that the Great Flu was caused by Pfeiffer’s 
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 bacillus. During the 1890s, one of the foremost bacteriologists of the world, Richard 
Pfeiffer, thought he had discovered the source of influenza. But even though it played a 
role in many secondary infections, Pfeiffer’s bacillus turned out to be the wrong 
causative organism. As Crosby wryly observes, “[the] chief significance of [Pfeiffer’s 
bacillus] is probably that it inveigled many scientists into wasting a lot of time discovering 
its insignificance”.83 
 
It is consequently expected that the “confusion of tongues” among the medico-
scientific community resulted in a profusion of advice.84 Throughout 1918-1919, 
newspapers such as The Times published a wealth of articles recommending everything 
from quinine as “probably the best preventive”, to avoidance of crowded areas, to 
mordantly noting that “a course of bed would probably [do] more good than all 
[scientific] arguments [about the causes and origins of the epidemic]”.85 Guidebooks 
published for the layman to educate them on the causes of colds and influenza provide 
some insight as to the recommended cures of the time. Russell Cecil recommended 
complete bed rest for the patient, who should be “given a hot drink, such as lemonade 
containing a teaspoonful or two of whisky” and piled with blankets to induce 
perspiration.86 G. W. Bacon and W. T. Fernie counselled strong cinnamon tea or 
“tabloids of cinnamon oil” as the “best germicide and antiseptic”.87 
 
Official statements disagreed, declaring that the “inhalation of certain essential 
oils and the administration of quinine, cinnamon, and other drugs do not ensure freedom 
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 from attack”.88 Advice came from abroad too: Dr. Anastasiadis, who had recommended 
his method of treating pneumonic complications to the Medical Society of Athens, 
advocated the injection of serum from blisters to the patient. The Evangelistas Hospital 
in Athens, on the other hand, claimed it was mercury that gave “brilliant results”.89 The 
“good effects of wine [continued] to be emphasised” in 1919 despite official advice 
stating that alcoholism favours infection.90 Amidst these precautions, businesses weighed 
in, advertising everything from the “germ killing throat tablet” Formamint, to 
disinfectants, to the fortifying advantages of liquid beef.91 
 
The profusion of complementary and conflicting advice showed that doctors 
were neither clear nor united as to what they were dealing with. The public, confronted 
with mounting death rates each week, demanded more certainty. The medical profession, 
which saw itself as superior to the ‘uneducated’ public, had no clear-cut answers. It was 
no wonder that attitudes towards the entire health profession were negative, and people 
were asking who was to be believed since “each doctor had a different method of dealing 
with this plague”.92 In spite of the chaos, however, physicians were confident that 
existing methods were fully capable of staying the death toll. While there was little 
consensus, the dominance of and faith in scientific medicine assured doctors that they 
were able to identify the causative organism for influenza, to create the appropriate 
vaccine, and to thereby solve the problem.93 
 
The members from the top medical circles were certainly not short on self-belief. 
The patrician elite that dominated early twentieth-century British medicine looked 
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 backwards to an imagined ‘Great Tradition’ in British (specifically English) medicine. 
This ‘Great Tradition’ was based on an abiding belief in the superiority of the English 
mind which gave English medicine its “natural historical turn and its down-to-earth, 
commonsensical quality. This quality was contrasted with the theoretical tendency of 
continental medicine that, in some way, was part of a frame of mind that gave rise to 
dangerous things such as Fascism and communism”.94 Hence, the dangers of an over-
reliance on laboratory science (incidentally, a hallmark of the German clinical school) 
were highlighted and the benefits of ‘English medicine’ championed.95 In a meeting of 
members from the medical profession at Steinway Hall to discuss the election of medical 
representatives to the House of Commons, one doctor declared that as a “great pioneer 
of all the cardinal discoveries with regard to public health and sanitation”, the English 
medical profession ought to take “steps to show its importance to the State and to the 
public”.96  
 
The influenza epidemic therefore incited the British medical elite to kick-start the 
process of medical reform that had been stalled by World War One. If the status quo i.e. 
the LGB was ineffectual, then pre-war plans for a Ministry of Health had to be 
revitalised. As The Times medical correspondent emphatically put it, “disease is 
preventable [and the] public means, quite seriously, that it shall be prevented”.97 As the 
official Report showed, the Great Flu taught that there could never be a time when 
mankind is securely master of the conflict with his “microscopic competitors”. This 
“hard truth” confirmed the need for a “universal improvement in the standards of health 
and the conditions of life” because “a sanitary environment for the community and the 
                                                
94 Christopher Lawrence, “Edward Jenner’s Jockey Boots and the Great Tradition in English Medicine 
1918-1939”, paper presented at the Society for the Social History of Medicine, University of Glasgow, 17 
July, pp. 1-2, quoted in Niall Johnson, “The Overshadowed Killer”, pp. 142-143. 
95 Risse, “History of Western Medicine”, p. 17. 
96 TT, 2 October 1918, p. 5. 
97 TT, 24 February 1919, p. 7. 
   
41 
 sound nutrition of the individual … are the bed-rock” of a successful society. Only then 
could man be the master of his fate. To do this, the newly-founded Ministry of Health 
urged for greater administrative methods for dealing with epidemics, further instruction 
of the public in the ways of preventive medicine, as well as the consolidation and 
perfection of the Ministry’s infrastructure and surveillance system.98  
 
In conclusion, the 1918-1919 pandemic was an experience that eluded attempts 
at control and held many implications for power at the levels of national self-appraisal, 
institutional growth, as well as professional consolidation. Despite provoking confusion 
and frustration amid the profession, however, the Great Flu shook but did not destroy 
the fundamental belief among medical men that they were in a position to lead since they 
possessed the means to control the diseases that threaten society. Although this 
experience marked a dent in triumphalist scientific attitudes, the British medical elite did 
not hark backward; instead they looked forward, advocating a “New Medicine” based on 
the “science of bacteriology”, which could find and eradicate any troublesome infection, 
and the virtues of preventive medicine.99 Overshadowed by World War One and 
possessing little of the horrors and stigma of cholera and bubonic plague, the Great Flu 
provoked a re-examination and refinement of the status quo rather than a transformation 
of its fundamental values. In spite of it all, the medical profession asserted a worldview 
that was marked by a confidence in its acquired social status and institutional ideals. As 
the case in Singapore will show in the following chapters, Western scientific medicine, its 
practitioners, and this worldview would extend towards British colonies in particular 
ways and expose new understandings of its power and its limitations. 
 
* 
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 Chapter Two 






The central idea that medicine is cognition and behaviour can be seen in the colonial 
experience in Singapore. Various postcolonial scholars have clearly demonstrated that 
colonialism was not just about superior technology, military and political organisation, or 
economics.1 Colonialism was also a cultural project of control and various colonial forms 
of knowledge both enabled and were produced by it.2 There were, therefore, both 
material and ideological dimensions to the imperial project and Western scientific 
medicine is integral to the manifestations of European conquest and control. By re-
examining colonial history in Singapore from the angle of disease and medicine, specific 
interest is given to the “instrumentality” of medicine; how varying ideas of disease and 
systems of health traverse geographical boundaries as much as the pathogens themselves; 
and how the complex power relations governing coloniser and colonised are revealed in 
Singapore.3  
 
The first part of this chapter examines the relationship between health, disease, 
and colonialism. Next, it looks at how Western scientific medicine affects the 
relationship between ruler and ruled in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
Singapore. The final section furthers the theme of power and control by tracking the 
development of colonial medical infrastructure in Singapore. By revealing the mindsets 
                                                
1 While the following list is obviously not exhaustive, the main texts framing Chapters Two and Three 
include: David Arnold, Editor, Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies; Norman G. Owen, Editor, Death and 
Disease in Southeast Asia: Explorations in Social, Medical and Demographic History, (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1987); Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis, Editors, Disease, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on Western 
Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion, (London & New York: Routledge, 1988); Manderson, 
Sickness and the State; Sheldon Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997). 
2 Nicholas B. Dirks, “Foreword” in Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India, Bernard S. 
Cohn, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. ix. 
3 Arnold, “Introduction”, p. 2. 
   
43 
 underlying British medical authority and the manner in which the locals adapted, ignored, 
and/or resisted colonial control, medicine becomes a useful lens for a socio-cultural 
appraisal of colonial society in Singapore at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, as our understanding of the Great Flu in Singapore cannot be divorced 
from the impact of the pandemic, the concepts of health, and the developments in 
Western scientific medicine in Great Britain, the findings in this chapter will help to 
contextualise the material that will be covered later in Chapter Three. 
 
 
Health, Disease, and Empire 
 
 
 In Chapter One, we saw how the growing conviction and confidence in the 
“unique rationality and superior efficacy of western medicine” was the result of various 
advances in medical science beginning at the end of the eighteenth century.4 Sheldon 
Watts argues that these advances, together with the growing professionalism of doctors, 
went hand-in-hand with Social Darwinism. In this new ideological configuration, Social 
Darwinism – the idea that Europeans were at the “very summit of the evolutionary chain 
and that they should, by right, dominate all other humankind” – could now be buttressed 
by a rising Western “scientism”. Edward Jenner’s discovery of cowpox vaccination as 
well as Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch’s advances in modern bacteriology proved to 
Europeans that their medical science was progressive, masterful, and efficacious. 
According the Watts, the period between 1880 and 1930 was marked by widespread and 
common “acceptance of medical doctors as [the people’s] first line of defence”. This 
gave unprecedented power to the medical profession in influencing public and state 
affairs. Eventually, this authority would be translated to the colonies as well. The 
correspondence between the professionalisation of medicine and the age of high 
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 imperialism was no coincidence; Western scientific medicine and the new discipline of 
tropical medicine were “instrument[s] of empire” that enabled Europeans to live in and 
exploit epidemiologically hostile areas such as the tropics.5 
 
 Western medicine and its corollary, public health, were “tools of empire” because 
they were of “both symbolic and practical consequence … as images representative of 
European commitments, variously to conquer, occupy, or settle”.6 It was directly related 
to the political, commercial and military expansion of the colonial powers because it 
enabled Westerners to penetrate distant regions and remain there. While it is 
acknowledged that overseas empire was expensive to human life, Philip Curtin points out 
that historians have seldom highlighted the extent of that cost. European commercial, 
political, and administrative influence would have been far less successful if, as Curtin 
terms it, the “relocation costs” of expansion remained abnormally high. The successes of 
industrial technology manifested through scientific medicine resulted, for example, in 
lowering the typical death rate of European soldiers in the tropics by ninety per cent 
between the early nineteenth century and the eve of World War One.7 In other words, 
before the colonial powers could effectively control their colonies, they had to first 
curtail the harmful effects of disease on European lives. This need to safeguard 
European health was therefore the initial, practical node from which all other ideological 
and material characteristics of imperialism extruded. 
 
 Control through medicine was a fundamental aspect of the colonial relationship 
with the foreign environments – epidemiological and otherwise – of their colonies. In 
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 one of the most prominent late nineteenth-century treatises on tropical disease, Essay on 
the Diseases Incidental to Europeans in Hot Climates, James Lind wrote that the successful 
inhibition of disease, rather than military power, was the manifestation of European 
control par excellence.8 Western scientific medicine was one of the ways in which the 
colonial powers sought to ‘know’ their subjects, be it through research on and clinical 
experience with local diseases, compiling statistics and records, or studying the effects of 
climate on the physiology of ‘Asiatics’. 
 
 The various Annual Reports and voluminous records in the Straits Settlements Blue 
Books reflect a predilection for whittling the population down into numbers, types, and 
various categories such as race, gender, and occupation. In short, everything that could 
be classified and numerically represented was – windows, ventilation openings, beds, and 
wards in hospitals were measured to see how high and wide they were, how far they 
could open, and how much space was expended per patient.9 Success and failure of 
medical policies were also judged in terms of numbers, even as administrators sometimes 
acknowledged that the statistics were far from accurate.10 These actions attest to the 
desire to comprehend subjects via an epistemology that was powerfully rooted in the 
intellectual trends in Europe at the time. The increasing valorisation of reason and 
empirics meant that people and populations were observed and then rationalised 
numerically, not as humans but more as facts. 
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 In Singapore, as with other imperial powers and their tropical conquests, the 
British looked towards tropical medicine to train colonial medical officers and support 
the expansion of imperial medical services.11 Practitioners of tropical medicine 
contributed to the growing discourse through a variety of monographs. For example, 
Gilbert E. Brooke, onetime port health officer in Singapore and lecturer at the Medical 
School of the Straits Settlements, espoused the validity of such ideas through his works. 
With textbooks such as Tropical Medicine, Hygience, and Parasitology and Essentials of Sanitary 
Science, Brooke outlined everything from the effects of heat to infectious tropical diseases 
to sanitary architecture and engineering. The first incarnation of Patrick Manson’s 
Tropical Diseases was a “small book” which could be “fitted into an ordinary pocket and 
cost ten shillings and sixpence”.12 This influential text served as an invaluable guide for 
those who ventured into the tropics, a dangerous pathological territory where “there is 
always a snake lurking in the grass, always an uphill fight with an unhealthy climate and 
deadly disease”.13 The discipline of tropical medicine is thus synonymous with the 
medicine of empire because it arose specifically to meet the needs of imperial 
development. As Worboys points out, the focus of scientific and medical research in the 
London School of Tropical Medicine were directed at “exploration and discovery; the 
prevention of disease; and the provision of technical advice and services”.14  
 
 Aside from any potential health benefits, medicine was also useful because it 
provided political currency that could cut many ways. For Michael Worboys, medicine 
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 demonstrated the progressiveness of the imperial government to audiences back home.15 
Amongst its colonial subjects, the “benevolent and paternalistic intentions” associated 
with medicine balanced out the more threatening features of colonial rule, thereby 
“establishing a wider imperial hegemony than could be derived from conquest alone”.16 
The perceived counter-balancing effects of medicine also allowed Britons to reflect 
positively on themselves as a decidedly superior race and yet compassionate power. 
“Justice”, “honour”, and “fair play” were their “national characteristics”; indeed they 
were “the only pucka white nation to the Malay … [Nothing] to their minds is beyond 
our power, from protecting them single-handed against their enemies to healing them of 
every disease, including paralysis”.17  
 
 The aims of the colonial political economy powerfully underpinned the 
instrumentality of medicine. Commercial and profit motives, consolidated under the 
banner of ‘development’, were enmeshed with various other modalities of control such 
as knowledge consolidation and creation, as well as public health. As Francis Freemantle 
declared, “attention to public health is the avenue to achievements and to wealth beyond 
the dreams of avarice”. The colonial political economy was one such system of control 
and exploitation that was inextricable from the implications of disease, since it was in the 
state’s interest to protect the private enterprises, labourers, merchants, administrators, 
and servants that help generate its profits. Many colonial administrators were aware of 
two things: first, that “all the wealth in the world will not profit a man broken down in 
health” and second, that “a dead or broken down coolie is of no practical use on any 
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 estate”.18 The Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, the London school’s counterpart, 
was promoted as an “investment in increased colonial trade” and backed by many 
leading colonial trading companies.19 Clearly, the impact of disease and medicine cannot 
be extricated from various political and socio-economic policies. 
 
 When Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie borrowed the phrase, “the unification of the 
globe by disease”, he referred to the common market of germs – the “pooling of 
resources” – that arose out of increased movement and thus communication among 
various disease vectors of the world.20 This economic metaphor is apt when we extend 
and apply it to the imperial project: Europeans fanned out to distant parts of the globe in 
search of new markets and resources and, in so doing, contributed greatly to the 
intermingling of different pathogenic environments. The creation of colonial 
infrastructure in the form of roads, railways, administrative and military centres as part of 
the overall commercial and political infiltration broke the barriers of land and sea, 
barricades which aided in quarantining diseases.21 Whilst the colonial state saw itself as 
possessing superior healthcare systems that were supported by more advanced 
knowledge and technology, the medico-intellectual arguments used to legitimise colonial 
intrusion were also very much mediated by economic self-interest. And so it was that 
colonial medical intervention tended to be piecemeal since any sensitivity to the “human 
costs of colonial development” were essentially underpinned by an economic rationalism 
that prioritised the material interests of the colonial master.22 
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 Metropole and Periphery: A Cleaving of Geographical, Epidemiological, and 
Cultural Spaces  
 
 
 In order to differentiate themselves from their colonial periphery, the British had 
to construct themselves as the superior race hailing from a nation possessing more 
sophisticated ideas, systems, and technology. That industrial London, the heart of the 
imperial metropolis, was a notoriously unhealthy place seemed to remain in the blind-
spot of many colonial administrators. In the age of High Imperialism, the European 
powers had to fashion themselves in increasing opposition to ‘native’ populations in 
order to justify varying forms of colonial involvement and “different intensities of 
violence”.23 As the periphery was re-configured in spatial, cultural, and racial terms, 
Western medicine and its image as a science (itself regarded as a superior epistemology) 
became a “necessary component of colonial discourse vis-à-vis health”.24 This tendency 
towards binary oppositions was not always the case and not always stable, but 
developments in science and the medical profession in England changed many Britons’ 
expectations of health and thus their relationship to their colonies. In this section, we will 
see how Europe was “made by its imperial projects, as much as colonial encounters were 
shaped by conflicts within Europe itself”.25  
 
 Prior to the nineteenth century, Western medicine was less authoritarian and, 
strikingly, instances of European collaboration with indigenous doctors and remedies 
were far more common and culturally accepted. For example, the East India Company 
encouraged its workers to rely on local rather than imported medicines. Apart from the 
prohibitive cost, the argument in 1622 was that “the Indies hath drugs in far greater 
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 plenty and perfection than here”. Europeans sought the help of native physicians, 
convinced that they were more experienced with the local diseases and thus would know 
the best cures for them.26 Exposure to traditional Chinese remedies from the seventeenth 
century onwards led Europeans to use Chinese herbs and methods such as acupuncture, 
the burning of moxa, and the reading of the pulse. In the mid-nineteenth century, some 
surgeons were using acupuncture to treat hernias, corneal opacity, varicose veins, and 
aortic aneurysms; the Leeds Infirmary even became a renowned centre for the treatment 
of osteoarthritis using acupuncture.27 
 
 It was also not hard to find parallels between nineteenth-century European and 
Southeast Asian responses to disease. British elite practitioners had no monopoly of the 
medical market and both humoral and miasmatic theories retained their intellectual and 
cultural validity for a long time. This resulted in observable convergences, rather than 
clear and monolithic delineations, among several different cultural traditions: fires used 
to cleanse the surroundings of miasmas and ghosts; holy waters to cure the ill; etiological 
notions of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’; and the Southeast Asian adaptation of various medical 
traditions from China, India, Arabia, and Europe. This “harmonious medley” of medical 
traditions was disrupted as the nineteenth century drew to a close because imperial 
medicine “reversed tendencies toward mutual borrowing”.28 Buttressed by science, 
rationality, and a vision of progress, medicine came to be seen as the domain of 
professional, university-educated doctors and surgeons in the late nineteenth century. In 
light of these developments, Asian medicine no longer seemed to proffer intellectual or 
therapeutic lessons from which Europeans could gain. 
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 By making a radical transition away from “medical pluralism”, Arnold argues that 
European medicine came to foster a “powerful discourse of authority and progress, 
committed to the extension of ‘expert’ control over otherwise intractable social 
systems”.29 Accordingly, the rhetoric shifted and new knowledge about these different 
spaces, climates, and peoples were amassed to fit imperial mindsets and aims. By the turn 
of the twentieth century, colonial administrators and doctors saw disease as part and 
parcel of the hostile and untamed tropics. The salubrity of Singapore became as integral 
to its image as were its picturesque dirtiness, thick jungles filled with tigers, and rivers 
containing crocodiles.30 Asia, Africa, and the Americas were not only dangerous and 
unknown but configured as spaces containing diseases that were enervating and fatal to 
the West as well. This supposed peril was based on racist constructions of the unknown 
Other located in an alien, unseen periphery, and from a fear of sickness affecting the 
metropole itself. 
 
 As the tropics were reconceived, the imperial centre acquired new meanings. 
Sander Gilman argues that Western representations of disease are symptomatic of the 
fear for the metropole’s own collapse. When Victor Heiser served as the principle health 
officer in the Philippines from 1905, his policies operated on the assumption that “as 
long as the Oriental was allowed to remain disease ridden, he was a constant threat to the 
Occidental who clung to the idea that he could keep himself healthy in a small disease 
ringed circle”. Such views would find their way into the literary works of that period: in 
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, England, like the Congo, was a place of “darkness” 
rather than a space securely apart from Africa. This was a vision of the metropole that 
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 was perpetually vulnerable to everything that was foreign, and tropical disease was an 
important component of that insecurity. To control this fear, European concerns were 
displaced unto foreign lands and people who were now configured as being more prone 
to disease.31 Conversely, the West was formulated in contradistinction to these ‘primitive’ 
and dangerous environments as a world that was safe, civilised and, importantly, 
sanitised. The fact that there were in reality many tropical diseases (especially in Africa) 
that were contagious and debilitating served to reinforce these perceptions and the 
colonial resolve to “establish increasingly more systematic sanitary and medical 
services”.32 
 
 Greater systematisation of medical knowledge can be seen in the way climate was 
closely studied. Climate was also intimately linked with sickness and race. In an essay on 
the medical topography of Singapore, Robert Little studied the climate in minutiae: the 
weather; the seasonal monsoons; the quality, direction, and quantity of rain; humidity; 
temperature; and even the direction of wind, right down to the number of hours it was 
blowing in each direction in each month, over a period of up to five years. A recurring 
idea in colonial medical discourse was that the humidity and heat “gives rise to… a 
universal relaxation of body and mind, especially of body, which creates a preternatural 
susceptibility to external impressions”.33 The hot weather and high humidity not only 
facilitated miasmas and the transmission of malaria but was highlighted as the reason 
behind ‘Asiatic’ health and moral failings. Where locals were once studied or consulted 
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 because they were seen as epidemiologically experienced, imperial medicine came to see 
Asians as victims to the “vicissitudes of the climate” and thus physiologically inferior.34 
Unlike the “very lowest classes in the West” who fully realise the “vital importance of 
sanitation in its relation to health”, the non-European inhabitants of Singapore displayed 
blatant “disregard of elementary sanitation”.35 They were morally inferior too, since the 
heat made one lazy. Such a climate was dangerous to Europeans because it had the 
potential to transform the energetic and productive Englishman to a life of lethargy and 
susceptibility to illness. 
 
 Factors such as physiology, diet, and occupation were also linked with race and 
had medical resonance as well. Here, Robert Little’s writings are again informative as he 
divided the inhabitants of Singapore into three classes according to a very particular 
schema. From his “medical point of view”, Europeans, Indo-Britains, Armenians, and 
Parsees formed the first class because they were energetic, “well fed and clothed”, 
worked in professions with limited exposure to disease, and inhabited a “mode of living” 
that was completely opposite to states of sickness. The Chinese, Siamese, and Cochin 
Chinese formed the second class. Members of this class had “gross, full and flabby” 
bodies, ate a poor diet, were addicted to opium, had jobs that exposed them to local 
diseases, and were poorly housed. At least, however, they were “industrious”, “hard 
working”, and “sufficiently clothed”. Those in the third class were physically small, “lazy 
and indolent”, were housed and lived poorly, and pursued occupations “which expose 
them to all the local influences creative of disease”. To this third class, Little included the 
“Malays, Bengalese, Klings, Javanese, Bugis, Portuguese descendents, Arabs, Caffres, 
Boyangs, in fact all natives of India and the Eastern Archipelago not included in the first 
and second classes, [as well as] convicts, who are natives of India […] and a few from 
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 Hong Kong”. Here, we can clearly see how class and race were conflated with pseudo-
medical rhetoric that was aligned with the imperial ideology of the period.36   
 
 The legitimisation of colonial actions and attitudes to disease in their colonies 
cannot be understood without considering certain culture-specific perceptions of illness, 
which were in turn linked with developments in medicine in Britain, the ideology of 
scientific progress, and social control. For all their claims to objectivity, the colonial 
construction of non-Europeans was subjective and coloured by racism and class, 
alongside other commercial agendas. In many senses, Ladurie’s “unification of the globe 
by disease” was also, in the colonial context, the forcing together of different worldviews 
and political systems. As medical and cultural spaces were drawn together, they were also 
paradoxically cleaved apart. In order to function as a colonising force, Britons had to 
install themselves in a position of power apart from their subjects, thus ending the far 
more collaborative medical relationship of prior centuries by extending their ideologies 
to all arms of the imperial machine. 
 
 
Colonial Medical Infrastructure and Responses to State Intervention 
 
 
 Although it was commonly espoused that good health was the “essential basis of 
empire on sure and progressive lines”, whether or not the state actively sought to provide 
for it was another matter altogether.37 Since it became apparent to the government that 
looking after their officers and labourers was imperative for safeguarding their 
commercial interests, the colonial regime was compelled to take a more active role in 
healthcare that extended beyond European expatriates and military men. The provision 
of Western health systems evolved from a “sorry and haphazard” state of affairs in the 
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 earliest phases of British involvement in the Straits Settlements, to “major efforts” to 
improve the health of the population in the 1920s.38 Medical provisions were initially 
lacking because early British involvement in the Settlements was primarily commercial. 
As the East India Company had funds that were limited and continually scrutinised, they 
did not see the profitability of providing medical services to the locals beyond what was 
already available for European support.39 In 1819, there was a grand total of one 
Assistant Surgeon in Singapore, who was in turn supported by a few subordinates such 
as apothecaries.40 Public confidence in the medical abilities of colonial civil medical 
officers was understandably low and the Medical Department languished under a woeful 
state of inefficiency well into the 1850s.41 
 
It was only when administrative control was transferred from India to the 
Colonial Office in 1867 that some measure of state involvement in the general well-being 
of the colony began to emerge. Aside from passing legislation on quarantine, registration 
of births and deaths, vaccination, and re-organising the Medical Department, the state 
also saw the need to improve conditions in hospitals such as the General Hospital and 
the Paupers’ Hospital. Under a more centralised management, the various medical 
institutions in Singapore were re-appraised and re-organised. Even though the state and 
some members of the European community displayed a growing concern for health-
related matters, economic and ideological factors still underpinned the development of 
local medical facilities. The tension lay in the need to maintain the discourse of a 
benevolent, superior regime alongside economic exploitation and political control. 
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 Therefore, while many were concerned with the poor health conditions of the local and 
immigrant population, the profit motive was never far from both individual and state 
action. 
 
In fact, letters to the Editors of local newspapers showed that there was 
considerable objection to calls for the provision of social welfare for the poor. Paupers 
around the island were described as “birds of passage, not having contributed to the 
welfare of the settlement [and therefore] were not entitled to community support” and, 
furthermore, “many of them had got into this sorry state as a result of [laziness] and 
opium smoking”. The state’s enlarged interest in healthcare was also often 
disproportionate to the amount of funds it was willing to provide towards public health. 
Success depended on the abilities of the Governor or colonial surgeons to canvass for 
political and financial support. Institutions like Tan Tock Seng Hospital had to be 
founded on and then supported by private donations from wealthy businessmen-
philanthropists in the Chinese and other communities. It was therefore clear that 
although colonial capitalism created the economic conditions to draw immigrants to 
Singapore in search of work and a better life, neither the state nor the richer members of 
the European community were especially keen on dealing with “leprosy, gangrene, 
cancer, and all the festering horrors of the East within a 100 miles”.42 
 
The lack of resident doctors in hospitals, overcrowding, poor hygiene, 
irresponsible apothecaries, and the evils of private practice were also perennial issues. To 
augment their salaries, Colonial Surgeons kept private practices and sometimes left the 
care of the hospitals with their subordinates. The potential for mismanagement and 
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 medical oversight was captured in the death of a Malay girl in late November 1869.43 The 
young girl, who had burnt herself when her clothes caught fire from an overturned lamp, 
was refused entry at two different hospitals. She was first taken to the police hospital, 
where she was turned away from the three Apothecaries there. She was then taken to the 
pauper hospital, more than a mile away, and although the Chinese clerk there did receive 
her, he did not call the Apothecary in charge because he had been given “strict orders 
never to call him during the night”. Left to her wounds, the girl died two hours later. The 
backlash from the Press was quick and highlighted both the inhumanity of the situation 
and the deficiencies of the system. There was, declared the Editor of the Straits Times, 
“something peculiarly revolting in this case, and it shows in a most painful light the 
defects of our present system of hospital management”. Explanations offered by the 
hospital (it was full; there was no accommodation for female patients) were branded as 
excuses.44 On top of registering this as a “crime against humanity”, the Straits Times 
Overland Journal added dryly that the Colonial surgeons would probably refrain from 
subjecting their private patients to the “infliction” of journeying over the macademized 
roads.45 
 
The avenues for treatment using Western medicine, therefore, were segregated by 
race and social class, overcrowded and unsanitary, inadequate for the burgeoning 
population, and often unaffordable or alien to those unfamiliar to Western modes of 
healing. When speaking of “diseased paupers”, observers admitted that the state was 
“guilty of much gross and culpable neglect in permitting such wretches to crawl about 
the Town and country”.46 And yet, while suggesting that it was the government’s duty to 
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 improve the standard of medical aid, the rhetoric of charity belied the fear of ‘natives’ 
infecting the European community: 
 
How long the maladies that are everyday imported may 
continue of a nature to cause no alarm to Europeans, it is of 
course impossible to say … We may be someday startled 
from our apathy by the sudden appearance among us of one 
of those general and fatal epidemics which have before now 
depopulated whole cities both in Europe and the East.47 
 
 
Hence, their growing numbers were not just a financial burden – these ‘Asiatics’ 
represented a vector of disease that threatened European immunities with the risk of 
epidemic disease as well. 
 
 As colonial biomedical infrastructure transitioned from its rudimentary 
beginnings at the ‘founding’ of Singapore, it came to include an expanded system of 
hospitals, practitioners, regulations, and a medical school in 1905. Sanitation was central 
to this increasing institutionalisation of Western scientific medicine. The privileging of 
preventive medicine and the acceptance of sanitation as integral to public health in 
Victorian England were transferred to the colonies in a bid to control filth and other 
forms of disorder that gave rise to disease. In the long run, proper sanitation would also 
reap economic benefits, since “money, judiciously and carefully spent on sanitary 
measures would, ere long, bring its reward in the shape of revenue”.48 Sanitary control, 
which became the “mainspring of municipal action”, was based on the belief that disease 
could be controlled and good health could be procured by managing and restructuring 
the environment using scientific principles.49 To that end, the state collected statistics, 
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 registered births and deaths, disinfected buildings, and made compulsory the notification 
of infectious diseases such as cholera, bubonic plague, and smallpox. 
 
Although Singapore was often presented as a model of administrative and 
economic success, many of its inhabitants lived in dire poverty.50 The poorest of them 
made do with dilapidated accommodations simply because they had no choice and not 
necessarily because they did not understand or want to live in clean environments. The 
role of colonial capitalism in creating the conditions for the poorest classes was a fact 
many authorities did not acknowledge, with some even going so far as to declare that 
“there is no poverty in Singapore”. By claiming that the “Asiatic cares nothing for 
sanitation, ventilation or even bare comfort”, authorities could conveniently ignore the 
stark reality that the poorest classes herding in the “Congested Areas, are so situated that 
they must live there if they are to live at all”.51 The efforts of municipal authorities were 
more focused on ensuring conformity to sanitary surveillance rather than tackling the 
root issues of poverty, illness, and overcrowding. The native police force and sanitary 
inspectors were deployed and instances of failed reporting (especially of infectious 
diseases) were met with fines and the removal of infected persons. Sanitary officers also 
had the authority to “remove cubicles, compartments, lofts, galleries, outhouses, and 
other structures to facilitate the exposure of disease and the cleansing and disinfection of 
premises”.52  
 
To the majority of the Asian immigrant and local population, many of these 
sanitary ideals and demonstrations of power were intrusive, highly disruptive, and 
differed from their own ideas about medicine and authority. Differences in worldviews 
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 and socio-political organisation, however, were elided in favour of labelling the 
uncooperative Asian population as ignorant, apathetic, intractable, and/or superstitious. 
In relation to this point, Municipal Health Officer W. R. C. Middleton’s memorandum is 
particularly telling: 
 
Habits, Customs and Tastes of Asiatics: Only those acting 
adversely on health need be mentioned. Among these may be 
mentioned employment of unskilled attendance at birth, 
improper feeding and clothing of infants, carelessness in the 
disposal of refuse and nightsoil, concealment of infectious 
disease, evasion of vaccination and re-vaccination, over-
crowding, storage of water, carrying on certain occupations in 
dwelling-houses, filthy habits of dairymen, adulteration of 
milk, use of nightsoil as manure, preparation of food under 
unsanitary conditions (by Food Hawkers and Eating-House 




This list is informative because it enumerates so many aspects related to the everyday life 
of Asians as somehow “acting adversely on health”. To the medical powers-that-be, too 
many aspects of their subjects’ lives seemed unruly and unclean and, therefore, had to be 
controlled for the public good. Nevertheless, the state’s measures for control were not as 
successful as authorities would have liked. The police were notoriously inefficient in 
enforcing the law and, like the sanitary inspectors, often willing to be bribed. People 
continued throwing their rubbish in the street, living in filthy premises, and not lime-
washing their houses, all the while pleading ignorance, non-involvement, or simply saying 
nothing at all.54 
 
 Resistance or apathy towards various sanitary practices ran alongside the attitudes 
that non-Europeans would have had towards Western scientific modes of healing. Each 
encounter between the “Asian plebeian class” and colonial authority was marked not 
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 only by differential power relations but diverse understandings of authority, taboo, and 
what constituted public and private space as well.55 As Arnold points out, “physical 
contact between doctor and patient could be one of the most direct and traumatic 
aspects of the colonial encounter”.56 Reactions to the heavy-handedness of colonial 
authority and Western medical paraphernalia such as medical equipment, machines, and 
injections ranged from varying degrees of acceptance to resistance in the form of 
avoidance. Acceptance came when people had time to see that forms of Western 
medicine, such as smallpox vaccinations, actually worked. Insensitivity or “strict and 
callous implementation” of vaccination caused people to go into hiding and be hid by 
relatives even though it was required by law to report them. The authoritarianism and 
zeal with which medical officers went about their work did not particularly ease the 
acceptance of a foreign medical system. It was no wonder then that “the natives [were] 
most generally averse to being treated medically in a hospital” or refuse to “have their 
relations carried to a hospital where convicts, vagrants, etc. are customarily treated”.57 
 
Unlike the case in India, where there was more interchange and borrowing of 
Indian medical ideas and practices, British authority in Malaya was established at a time 
when “scientific advances had already captured the imagination, and [its practitioners] 
were supremely confident of its superiority”.58 Western medicine thus co-existed 
alongside rather than co-opted indigenous therapies. These ‘traditional’ and ‘unscientific’ 
modes of medical practice were tolerated only because they obviated the responsibility of 
caring for a significant segment of the population.59 In times of sickness and need, most 
Asians instinctively consulted their own established medical traditions reflecting their 
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 cultural worldviews and disease etiologies. Approaches to healing also tended towards 
being pluralistic or syncretic. This attitude was antithetical to Western scientific medicine, 
which tended to see itself as modern, exclusivistic, and with implicit claims to 
omniscience.60 
 
As Walter Skeat and John Gimlette’s works show, Malays had their bomohs and 
pawangs, healers who combined their skill with the supernatural arts with humoral medical 
theory.61 Although some were frauds, there were many others who used dreams, 
meditation, prayers, and special incantations alongside a complex pharmacology in order 
to dispel various physical or mental ailments.62 People also sought a variety of remedies 
ranging from ‘home cures’ like param (small flattened balls of medicine usually made 
from different herbs and spices) obtained from trusted herbalists; massages; siram (the 
pouring of water blessed with prayers from the Quran on ailing body parts); and relied 
on folk beliefs and ‘old wives’ tales’ for managing certain day-to-day illnesses.63 
 
The continued popularity of traditional therapeutic practices and lay healing 
knowledge in Malaysia and Singapore today suggests their “deep-seated historical 
presence in the region” and attests to their medico-cultural potency during the colonial 
period.64 Chinese medical practice and resources were also extensive in the Straits 
Settlements. Brenda Yeoh notes that between 1870 and 1928, there were at least 58 
Chinese medical halls in Singapore from which herbs, drugs, and medical advice could be 
dispensed. Chung-i, freelance physicians who formed the most basic level of the Chinese 
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 medical delivery system, operated from clan associations, temples, the marketplace, or 
their own homes fulfilled the medical needs of the lowest classes of the Chinese 
community. Although Ayurvedic practice appears to be the least established presence in 
Malaya, they nonetheless existed to assist the communities who subscribed to their 
particular remedies.65 
 
It has been established in Chapter One that scientific medicine often made 
greater claims to its potential efficacy rather than the reality of widespread, successful 
therapeutics. Therefore, while tropical medicine involved many of the theoretical 
advances in microbiology, it also contained a healthy dose of imperial arrogance.66 
However, although colonial medical men liked accusing “native practitioners” of the 
“grossest malpractice”, British doctors had to accept the fact that they were only one part 
of a rich and diverse medical landscape.67 The medical fraternity jealously guarded their 
superiority and legislated against unqualified ‘native’ practitioners who borrowed 
methods and remedies from Western medicine. As a result of delineating between those 
practicing scientific and unscientific medicine, ‘native’ doctors were installed as 
‘traditional’ and left undefined by the state – they were neither qualified nor unqualified. 
Even though the medical fraternity was highly critical of any government support of 
these healers, so long as they did not impinge on Western medical territory, ‘native’ 
practitioners were apparently free to engage in ‘Asiatic’ therapeutics.68 In this way, these 
‘unorthodox’ and ‘indigenous’ healers continued to flourish and remain vitally important 
to the communities they served.  
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 From the perspective of the colonial powers, Singapore was a flourishing and 
advanced settlement consisting of a peaceful heterogeneous society existing “in order 
and sanitation, living and thriving and trading, simply because of the presence of English 
law and under the protection of the British flag”.69 The reality was not so ideal and far 
more complex. While the British regime in Singapore was comparatively a benevolent 
one, the practice of imperial medicine was not unproblematic. As Manderson highlights, 
for many people sickness and death were shaped by the “inequities, powerlessness and 
poverty produced by the structures of colonialism, resulting in small resistances, labour 
strikes, and insurgency”.70 
 
Western scientific medicine challenged non-European worldviews and medical 
practices, often side-stepped the role of poverty and malnutrition in causing disease, 
provided medical services which were substandard and limited in exposure, and 
contained as part of its apparatus increasingly intrusive forms of control as part of the 
extension of colonial authority. In the face of colonial medical and state intervention, the 
inhabitants of Singapore adapted, resisted, avoided, and/or ignored. The 
authoritarianism of imperial medicine, its institutions, and its forms of control in the 
name of public health had to continually work to assert its power by re-negotiating its 
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This chapter focuses on the Great Flu in Singapore in order to situate the relationship 
between medicine, disease, and colonialism within a particular episode. The British 
extended their confidence in the medical science to their colonies in particular ways, and 
the 1918 flu outbreak helps to expose new understandings of the state’s power and its 
limitations. Epidemics therefore provide a “convenient and effective sampling device” 
for investigating socio-cultural values and practices and, in the context of imperialism, 
serve as indices of colonial competency.1 This chapter begins by examining the first wave 
of the pandemic and follows with an investigation of the role of Western scientific 
medicine during two adjacent influenza outbreaks in colonial Singapore. The next section 
tracks the second, more important wave of the pandemic and discusses the responses at 
the state and public levels. Finally, the last section will evaluate the consequences of the 
pandemic on the state, medicine, and the population.  
 
 
The First Wave 
 
 
 While the British fretted over the strength of their troops in France, an ill wind 
was blowing across Europe and Asia in the summer of 1918. Influenza joined the war in 
Western Europe and exploded thenceforth, reaching Bombay in June, from where it 
found its route into the Straits Settlements.2 On 18 June, a “mysterious epidemic” was 
reported to be prevailing in Spain and in the Far East and large numbers of people from 
Singapore to Peking seemed to be affected by a sickness that induced body aches, fevers, 
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 and vomiting. This “mysterious disease”, which was attributed to “the irregularity of the 
weather”, was the first mention of the first wave of the outbreak in Singapore.3 In 
Manila, the “mysterious malady” was called “Tancazo” and “[played] pranks with the 
population” there as it did in Singapore and Hong Kong, affecting businesses and 
households in its wake.4 Other than attributing the disease to the weather, it was also 
suggested that eating durians caused the illness, although it was noted that the Chinese 
and Malays who consumed the fruit did not seem to be adversely affected.5  
 
One month later, the epidemic was raging in the colony and had gotten “the 
whole Far East in its grip” as well.6 Tan Tock Seng Hospital saw a spike in the number 
of influenza cases – in the third week of June a “particularly violent type” of flu-related 
pneumonia appeared, resulting in the need to hire six extra dressers.7 Elsewhere, the 
malady acquired its other famous moniker (Spanish influenza) and was described as “a 
disease arising from hunger, exhaustion and exposure” that was seriously affecting the 
troops in Flanders.8 This was not the first report of something wrong with the health of 
the armies – few could expect that this was an omen of worse things to come a mere few 
months later, as the First World War came to a close.  
  
 The state response towards influenza during the June-July outbreak was relatively 
mute. This was probably because compared to other places such as Bombay where the 
“influenza scourge” caused a surge in death rates among the old and infants of the 
poorer classes, the first wave in Singapore was relatively mild, with high morbidity but 
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 low mortality.9 At its peak however, mortality rates reached as high as 60.8 per mille in 
first week of July.10 A comparison of mortality returns at the beginning versus the middle 
of July show a remarkable consistency in the number of deaths related to phthisis 
(pulmonary tuberculosis), malaria fever, beri-beri, smallpox, plague, and cholera. Of the 
major causes of deaths in the mortality returns in Singapore during that period, only 
pneumonia cases saw a spike from 38 to 49 reported cases at the end of July.11 Even if 
mortality rates were supposedly not as serious as it was elsewhere, the flu was certainly 
making its mark on the population. 
 
The general indifference could also be because there were other diseases in 
Singapore that worried the authorities more. Although Municipal Commissioners noted 
the rise in the death rate, influenza was treated lightly in comparison to malaria: 
 
There had been a disease – Siberian influenza some called it – 
[Roland Braddell] had had it himself (laughter) – at any rate 
the death-rate had been high and yet they were short of 
doctors, and supervision had been growing less and less, and 
at the present moment the staff in charge of a Municipality of 
a city of [300,000 over] inhabitants could be described as 
laughable – and in spite of that shortage one of their doctors 
had been mobilised. (Laughter) … The President said he 
thought they should take drastic steps to deal with the 
question of mosquitoes. (Hear, hear).12 
 
 
 While more than one member in the meeting emphasised the importance of 
being “up and doing in [the] matter of malaria”, the flu was not considered deadly 
enough to warrant any “drastic steps”. Therefore, although there was an extended 
discussion about the “malaria scourge in Singapore” during the Municipal meeting, the 
current outbreak of influenza was not deliberated further. The President closed the 
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 meeting by expressing his hopes that the health of the town would stabilise in a month 
or two; the Commissioners were urged to “keep their spirits up though, of course, he did 
not want them to sit and do nothing”.13 This relative lack of concern for influenza in 
Singapore has to be understood alongside institutional and ideological developments in 
science, medicine, and health in the West. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, 
Europeans developed particular understandings of medicine by the late nineteenth 
century and transported these worldviews to their colonies through discourse and state 
institutions. Influenza was no exception. The changing ideas regarding disease and 
medicine in general, and influenza in particular, can be explained by comparing the 
reactions to two adjacent flu pandemics in Singapore’s colonial history. 
 
 
From 1890 to 1918: Western Scientific Medicine and The Influenza Scourge 
 
 
 The “influenza scourge”, as it was popularly referred to in many newspaper 
articles in 1918, was not the first of its kind in Singapore. We can only speculate on 
earlier outbreaks, but in the absence of written records it is possible that she also 
experienced the other global, “true pandemics” of 1732-1733 and 1781-1782 during pre-
colonial times.14 What is clear, however, is that the British encountered a significant flu 
outbreak in Singapore in 1890. During a three-month wave from February to April, the 
so-called Russian Flu descended upon the settlement with the usual suddenness that 
influenza epidemics are wont to do. Officials admitted that although it was hard to 
obtain accurate statistics, nobody could deny that influenza was running rampant by 
March and “obtaining a daily increasing hold, particularly among the poorer classes of 
[the] Asiatic population”.15 Even if the outbreak was comparatively mild, over 200 cases 
had been reported by the end of February. Schools, businesses, and offices were affected 
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 by high rates of absenteeism. Elsewhere, daily working life was disrupted as coolies at the 
Tanjong Pagar wharf, bankers, and workers of the General Post Office were also “much 
affected”.16  
 
The 1890 outbreak would have left the British (who already have much historical 
experience with influenza epidemics in Europe) with some level of institutional memory 
of the flu’s attendant effects on the population in Singapore. Although the personnel 
would have changed by 1918, clearly this was not a colonial administration that was naïve 
about influenzal visitations. It is interesting to note the tone, rhetoric, and opinions when 
we compare the newspaper reports between the two outbreaks. In 1890, the Straits Times 
Weekly Issue reminded readers that although it was a “widespread but not very dangerous 
evil”, it was nonetheless unwise to dismiss influenza as a mere bad cold: 
 
[The] present generation had almost forgotten what true 
influenza is, and we have come to apply the term to the 




Reminders of the harmful potential of “true influenza” were juxtaposed 
alongside calls to remain calm and to take care of one’s health while allowing the disease 
to run its course. Unlike the suggestions made during 1918, which overwhelmingly 
advocated the disinfection of premises and prescribing things like gargles and other 
Western-based medicines, it is striking how some of the articles during 1890 were candid 
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One doctor of good standing told us candidly that he 
believed there was no preventive or cure for the disease, 
and all that could be done was to alleviate the 
inconvenience as much as possible and allow [the flu] to 
run its course; at the same time care should be taken to 
avoid draughts or sudden change of temperature; due 
discrimination should be used in the matter of bathing. 
Warm dry clothes should be worn and the feet especially 
kept as free from damp as possible […].18 
 
 
Although there were links made between the disease and sanitation, these 
“ordinary common sense precautions” advocated during the Russian Flu were markedly 
different from the overwhelming emphasis on prescribed medicines and the need for 
greater sanitary control that would inform the newspaper reports of 1918. Literature 
contemporary to the Spanish Flu suggest that there was some awareness of the dangers 
of influenza and how it could impede the state’s economic interests. For instance, in his 
list of the most important infectious diseases affecting coolies, P. N. Gerrard includes 
influenza alongside small-pox, cholera, chicken-pox, measles, dengue, and plague. 
Gerrard cautioned that the flu “must not be trifled with nor neglected” – even if most 
people have had experience with the disease, “every endeavour should be made” to 
prevent the disease from spreading.19 However, by the early twentieth century there was 
much more belief invested in the curative powers of Western scientific medicine. Thus, 
measures such as potassium permanganate gargles and quinine were routinely given, even 
if the results proved unsatisfactory.20 
 
A comparative survey of responses between the influenza outbreaks of 1890 and 
1918 reveal the evolving nature of the state’s medical involvement by the early twentieth 
century. It is significant that the Acting Health Officer himself pointed out that the flu’s 
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 prevalence in 1890 bore “no relation to defective drainage or other local sources of 
sanitary evils”.21 By contrast, numerous newspaper articles in 1918 highlighted the 
importance of regularly disinfecting the floors of premises in curbing the spread of the 
flu. Throughout October and December, the disinfectant “Izal” was advertised in the 
Straits Times, proudly touting itself as “recommended by the Municipal Commissioners 
for combating Spanish Influenza”.22 
 
At St. John’s Island, patients, “infected contacts”, affected camps, and 
Government quarters were “re-disinfected” and “washed out with Sanitas Okol” while 
all bedding left to air out in the sun.23 On the one hand, these measures demonstrate 
improved understandings about the nature of germs; on the other, it revealed an 
administrative logic that was built upon evolving ideas about the relationship between 
cleanliness, contagion, and control. The disinfection of buildings and premises was 
intimately connected to the scientific principles of preventive medicine and sanitation 
that governed medical thought and thereby sanctioned municipal action. As we saw in 
Chapter Two, the state became more involved in the medical scene by the turn of the 
twentieth century and sanitary control had become the “mainspring of municipal action” 
in safeguarding public health.24 Consequently, the treatment of influenza shifted away 
from merely advocating warm clothes and bed rest; it now privileged medical 
prescriptions, crowd control, and sanitary boards to re-evaluate the state of overcrowded 
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 The October-November Wave: Impact and Response 
 
 
 The second wave of the Great Flu in Singapore coincided with global patterns 
and struck with particular intensity for about three weeks from October to November. 
As was the case in other parts of the world, this outbreak was marked by “Broncho-
pneumonia of extreme virulence and productive of a heavy mortality”. This second wave 
was instrumental in raising the annual death rate in Singapore to 43.85 per mille, against 
36.98 in 1917 and the average over the decade of 37.45 per mille. The highest weekly 
death rate, 97.57 per mille, was recorded in the last week of October, nearly double that 
of the highest of any week in 1917. Further understanding of the impact can also be 
surmised when we consider the statistics for the Straits Settlements hospitals: in 1917, 
there was only one admission treated for influenza, with no influenza-related deaths, and 
562 cases for pneumonia with 260 deaths. In 1918, the figures are starkly elevated: a total 
of 3,054 people were admitted for influenza and of those cases, 474 deaths. Hospital 
admissions for pneumonia also increased significantly, with 1,197 patients and 422 
related deaths.26  
 
 In Singapore, there were 844 officially recorded deaths directly related to the 
Great Flu. However, officials were quick to point out that this figure bore “little relation 
to the actual number of deaths which resulted directly or indirectly from that disease”. 
Given the proclivity for epidemic influenza to create a host of complications, authorities 
highlighted that the death toll could be pegged at 3,500 after the excess deaths registered 
under pneumonia, bronchitis, phthisis (pulmonary tuberculosis), and “fever not 
specified” were included.27 Scholars point out that the flu also frequently induced other 
diseases such as malaria, haemorrhages of the nose and lungs, and dysentery. This was 
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 largely because people tended to return to work when the first fevers had subsided, 
before they were fully recovered. While it is impossible to confirm the number of deaths 
due to influenza complications, the marked increase in mortality related to malaria fever, 
tuberculosis, and dysentery in 1918 against the two previous years suggest that the flu 
probably did have a part to play in exacerbating these diseases.28 The real death toll was 
also obviously higher since 3,500 only denotes the number of reported cases. As 
highlighted in Chapter Two, many of the Asian inhabitants in Singapore could neither 
afford nor care for going to the government hospitals and existed beyond the purview of 
the state’s numerical surveillance. Besides, influenza is a disease that is particularly 
amenable to under-reporting since many dismiss it as just a bad cold and prefer to 
recuperate at home. 
 
 With the spike in mortality rates, the most visible institutional impact was on 
hospitals. The strain was particularly acute since the hospital system was frequently 
described as “antiquated” and insufficient for a colony as densely populated and 
commercially important as Singapore.29 In a town where “illness is seldom, if ever, absent 
from a family, while the hospitals are full”, it is unsurprising that epidemic outbreaks of 
diseases such as influenza would strain the already inadequate infrastructure.30 As a 
prophylactic, medical staff segregated influenza sufferers from other patients. This was, 
however, only possible in the early stages of the epidemic. By the time the outbreak 
peaked in the last week of October, segregation became impossible and the issue of 
accommodation became serious. Doctors issued compulsory gargles of Potassium 
Chlorate and expectorants, but this routine treatment proved useless as the disease swept 
through the General Hospital, affecting almost all patients and half the nurses. Due to 
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 the shortage of staff, many former nurses had to be enlisted to help out during this 
critical period.31  
 
Virtually all hospitals in Singapore were affected by the flu. The disease had been 
prevalent in the Prison Hospital for a few months, with 53 admissions and 4 deaths due 
to pneumonia. In Tan Tock Seng Hospital, it is debatable if the flu ever died out 
following the first wave in June. While the virulent pneumonic complications had 
diminished by August, influenza never really went away and a recrudescence was 
observed by the third week of September. When the second wave reached its height in 
October, 547 patients were admitted, 444 of which sustained pneumonic complications, 
and 210 eventually succumbed. The disease exacted its toll on patients and staff alike as 
mortality rates reached roughly 40 per cent. Unable to cope with worker and space 
constraints, a temporary Assistant Surgeon had to be hired and a large temporary ward 
erected. Elsewhere, the Beri-Beri Hospital also had its fair share of flu patients, but 
fortunately the disease was comparatively mild among its sufferers, and all 29 cases 
managed to recover. In the Kandang Kerbau Hospital for Females, four out of the 33 
admissions succumbed when the epidemic returned at the end of September.32  
  
 It is inevitable that the epidemic would have some kind of economic impact since 
it had a high rate of morbidity. Those who were lucky enough to escape the fatal 
potential of the flu would still have had their daily working lives disrupted. After all, the 
affliction did not earn the nickname “knock me down fever” for nothing.33 Government 
offices were badly hit, since over five hundred medical certificates were issued to civil 
servants for influenza alone. Estates such as those along Choa Chu Kang Road were 
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 reportedly struck by “a few deaths from Influenza and an aftermath of several from 
pneumonia”.34 The outbreak also made inroads into the rubber estates. For British 
Malaya Rubber, 1918 was “looked back upon as one of [their] most disappointing years” 
due to the “severe outbreaks of influenza” which occurred alongside labour shortages 
from India and poor climate conditions. The epidemic not only disrupted the 
organisation of labour but made it impossible for the company to carry out their policy 
of extending capital cost per acre as well.35 The flu also affected the health of estate 
workers from the Seletar Rubber Company and resulted in a reduction of 6,000 pounds 
in the crop of November alone.36 
 
What was the response at the level of the colonial state, in view of the flu’s 
impact from October onwards? As discussed in Chapter One, the extent of the hardship 
in Britain was significantly affected by the inertia in Whitehall. This was a result of 
prevailing medical and cultural attitudes towards influenza as a disease and the 
overwhelming importance of World War One. If the situation in the metropole reflected 
such administrative sluggishness, it would be interesting to see if the periphery revealed a 
similar state of affairs. Any assessment of state involvement, however, has to be 
tempered by the fact that this particularly virulent strain of influenza was occurring at a 
time when there was little understanding of what a virus was. Furthermore, this is not a 
disease that can be completely contained. That said, while the state cannot be solely 
blamed for the high death rates, its response can be assessed through the colonial 
government’s willingness and ability to co-ordinate and mobilise resources for a major 
public health crisis.37 
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 In general, the colonial authorities adopted a “wait and see” attitude even though 
there were warning signs of the mounting seriousness of the situation by early October. 
This is partly due to the perception that the flu was not dangerous enough to destabilise 
the economic, political, or social status quo. It is also important to note that in light of 
World War One, the first concern was with safeguarding Britain’s financial interests. As 
the Colonial Secretary stated in his address to the Legislative Council, “up to the end of 
1918, economy was [the main] aim”.38 It could also be argued that when it came to 
detecting infectious diseases, the medical authorities in British Malaya already had an 
epidemiological system covering foreign ports and a “network of huge quarantine camps 
from Singapore in the south to Penang in the north” that had been established since the 
1870s. Faith in this system, however, was misplaced when it came to monitoring 
influenza. As Liew argues, the “fundamental loophole” in the regime was the failure to 
include influenza in the list of notifiable contagious diseases.39 By omitting it from the 
ordinances, the sickness spread freely without the need for official surveillance. The first 
few reports emerged in early October, when the Spanish flu held a “firm grip of the 
Federal Capital” and hospitals were so full that admissions had to be denied.40 Fear 
spread alongside the “influenza scourge” through Malaya, where work on the estates 
were brought to a standstill:  
 
[The] scourge must be costing estates some thousands of 
dollars already … Large numbers of coolies are being affected 
suddenly; the work of estates is being temporarily paralysed; 
there is in some quarters considerable anxiety aroused not 
only in the minds of the managers of the estates but also that 
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 These early reports were also found elsewhere in the Straits Settlements. For 
example, the Straits Times correspondent in Penang reported a “recrudescence of the 
locally called ‘Singapore influenza’” that was “affecting all sections” of the population.42 
This so-called “Singapore influenza” was just as quick in reappearing in its eponymous 
town around the same time. As pointed out above, hospitals in Singapore were already 
beginning to see a recrudescence of cases by the end of September. During the first week 
of October, influenza was reported to be “raging again”, overwhelming hospital staff and 
whole households. Based on these early signs, it was suspected that this wave was “going 
to outdo its predecessor, earlier in the year, in virulence”.43 These first intimations were 
augmented by an official telegram sent from the Governor-General of South Africa to 
the Governor of the Straits Settlements on 13 October to warn the latter of the “highly 
pneumonic characteristics” and extreme infectiousness of the “Spanish Fever”. The 
telegram highlighted the “extreme seriousness of the malady” and was specifically sent as 
a “timely warning” so that the Straits Settlements could be “spared similar calamity”.44 In 
other words, there was no excuse for the state to be caught off-guard since the 
population had already begun to be noticeably affected and the authorities strongly 
forewarned. 
 
Immediate action was certainly needed worldwide by mid-October. From this 
period onwards, the pandemic was severe in Britain and had begun to assume the 
“proportions of a national calamity” in her other colonial possessions such as India, 
South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia.45 The flu was also making its presence felt in 
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 British Malaya as a whole. While there was a greater sense of urgency, however, there 
was also a corresponding call for calm. On the one hand, people were reminded not to 
“treat an attack of the illness as a cold to be worried through without medical advice or 
treatment” since reports showed that the flu was “raging in the [Federated Malay States] 
and in Singapore”.46 On the other, the public was also told not to be alarmed because the 
“influenza is not unduly serious yet, and there is not reason to think that it will be”. The 
outbreak was even presented as less serious than the June-July wave in some media 
reports. The Singapore Free Press assured its readers that Singapore was “largely protected 
from such visitations, as in the case of plague and other undesirable things, by its 
equitable climate”. Furthermore, since there were few who took up the Municipality’s 
offer to disinfect houses, the reporter took it as a sign that there was “not really much of 
the ‘flu’ about”.47 Therefore, although the indications since the beginning of the month 
pointed otherwise, a general sense of “don’t panic” was issued: 
 
Singapore need not get alarmed. The influenza is not unduly 
serious yet, and there is no reason to think that it will be. The 
present outbreak, as a matter of fact, is not nearly so bad as 
that of several months ago… [The] ‘flu’ as present here is of a 
mild character, calling for precautions but furnishing no 
excuse for special perturbation.48 
 
 
It was obviously absurd to believe that a port city with a sizeable population and 
which was as connected to global trade patterns as Singapore would be protected from 
epidemics, let alone from a virus as infectious as influenza. The disease was easily 
introduced and circulated by infected articles, inhabitants, and sojourners alike. Dutch 
ships from Bandjarmasin, Bawean, and Batavia arrived at St. John’s Island, carrying 
passengers who ended up infecting staff at the quarantine station there, including the 
Engineer’s family and his servants. During their stay on the island, the passengers from 
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 the S. S. Camphuys, S. S. Van Hoorn, S. S. Van Rees, and the S. S. Senang contributed a 
total of 57 flu admissions to the hospital, out of which 18 were fatalities from 
complications due to broncho-pneumonia.49 Moreover, since it has an incubation period 
of anywhere between a few hours to three days, influenza proliferated effortlessly 
through letters and parcels, and was just as easily spread when newspapers made their 
way around the island.50 The state eventually addressed the loophole in their surveillance 
system on 19 October by amending the 1915 Quarantine and Prevention of Disease 
Ordinance: influenza was finally listed as an infectious disease.51  
  
It was also a myth that the epidemic was not getting serious: for the third week of 
October alone, there were 107 deaths from pneumonia, against 47 for the previous week 
and a weekly average of 20.52 As highlighted earlier in this chapter, the official response 
in 1918 coincided with prevailing medical trends, which privileged Western scientific 
medicine and emphasised preventive medicine through sanitation. Aside from systemic 
changes such as amending the Infectious Disease Ordinance, the colonial authorities also 
increased the watering of the streets to “lay the dust which was always a source of 
danger” for diseases like the flu and disseminated information about the disease in both 
English and other vernacular languages in the newspapers.53 In addition to this, the state 
supplied the public with free medicines at the Government dispensaries at Jalan Klapa 
and North Canal Road at the height of the outbreak.54 The authorities also considered 
housing infected patients in a single building in order to prevent the spread of the 
disease. However, the wards suggested at the Moulmein Road hospital were only 
available for municipal employees and therefore too small. Besides, the hospital was 
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 short staffed. As such, even though officials wanted to try and remove the sick from the 
“fearfully congested rooms that existed in Singapore”, their plans were thwarted by the 
inadequacy of the colonial medical infrastructure.55 The Municipality published advice in 
the newspapers that was centred around self-policing, surveillance, and disinfection: 
 
The extraordinary contagiousness of the sickness … makes it 
an imperative duty for every member of the community not 
only to safeguard himself when attacked but to safeguard 
others by avoiding mixing with them … [Care] should be 
taken on any sign of the illness to report the matter to the 
Municipal authorities and have their premises disinfected.56 
 
 
The state interpreted these measures as more than sufficient. During a Municipal 
Meeting, the Health Officer shared how “personally he thought that everything 
reasonable had been done and he thought that with a change of weather things would 
improve”. The President concurred, saying that he felt “all that can be done is being 
done just now”.57 Additionally, according to the Acting Health officer J. A. R. Glennie, 
they had been ordered by the Government to “go slow and interfere with the people as 
little as possible” ever since World War One began.58 This would probably explain why 
cinemas were not closed even though the British believed that the “gathering of crowds 
in markets and theatres and other places” encouraged the spread of the disease.59 This 
was unlike the case in Penang and Malacca, where Chinese and Malay theatres as well as 
cinematography shows were “closed until further notice” to prevent the spread of the 
disease.60 The issue of closing places of entertainment even precipitated a brief spat in 
the newspapers, where three correspondents argued about the need for closing cinemas 
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 and theatres as well as what constituted places of public assembly.61 Nevertheless, the 
state was reluctant to act and the Marlborough, Alhambra, Harima Hall, and Pallidum 
theatres continued advertising their shows well into November.62  
 
Public pressure was more effective when it came to issue of schools. It is 
probable that the combination of public sentiment and mounting flu cases by late 
October convinced the Municipality to act. According to one article, schools were said to 
be “not yet seriously affected” and moreover, it was “a distinct annoying thing to close 
down schools” since the Cambridge examinations were just ahead.63 Letters to the Straits 
Times Editor suggest otherwise. On 17 October, “Prophylactic” pointed out that even 
though the authorities had issued warnings regarding the epidemic, “very little assistance 
is to be obtained [from the Municipality] in preventing the spread of the disease”: 
 
[Surely] the authorities might move first and do what would 
be obvious to any ordinary layman, and that is to immediately 
close all the schools. Anyone can realise that the daily close 
association of scholars is an idea way to spread infection … 
Why, in the name of common sense, should it be necessary to 
wait for a certain number of cases to be reported before this 
elementary protection is taken?64 
 
 
“Prophylactic” echoed the sentiments of other concerned residents. Another writer, 
“Cosandrew’s”, agreed that it was “quite absurd [not] to close the schools after nearly 
half, or perhaps more, of the pupils are taken ill”. Further, s/he went on to point out that 
if the Health Department “[did] not exist only in name, it ought to at once exercise its 
authority and have the schools closed immediately, for a fortnight at the very least”.65 Yet 
another correspondent, Chew Cheng Yong, endorsed the suggestion that the authorities 
                                                
61 SB, 1 November 1918, pp. 13-14. 
62 ST, 1 November 1918, p. 10. 
63 SFP, 17 October 1918, p. 10. 
64 ST, 17 October 1918, p. 8. 
65 SB, 25 October 1918, p. 17. 
   
82 
 “close the schools without waiting for more fatal cases of influenza to happen” – 
“common sense and self-protection” meant it was natural for parents to keep their 
children at home to either recuperate or prevent contagion anyway. Shortly after these 
letters were published, the authorities moved to close all schools in the Settlement for 
one week, and halted all parades from the Boy Scouts’ Association until the end of 
October.66  
 
 At the public level, the people’s response to the epidemic was coloured by their 
understandings of disease and their expectations for what constituted proper cures. Some 
took the opportunity to comment on the state of cleanliness in Singapore by linking it to 
the spread of disease. One of the causes of concern was dust. One writer to the Straits 
Times pointed out that “dust [was] probably a prolific cause of infection in the present 
epidemic”. Hence, it was necessary for the government to clean up the roads in places 
such as River Valley and Oxley Road, where conditions were “disgraceful” and the dust 
lay “several inches deep”.67 Other scientific theories about the Great Flu were also 
circulated. Reviews from medical journals like The Lancet cited eucalyptus inhalations as 
“an absolute preventative” while some bacteriologists “unanimously recommended 
inoculation as a preventive or effective curative influence”.68 Some even wondered if the 
flu epidemic was a result of “vapour from gas bombs” that was being “absorbed into the 
atmosphere in France” before spreading thence all over the globe.69 
 
 The epidemic also spawned a host of products advertising their curative 
capabilities. As the standard treatments offered by state medical practitioners were 
generally ineffective, people would have considered buying these remedies. Businesses 
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 reacted to the crisis by promoting their own cures, which moved in line with prevailing 
Western scientific medical theories. Hudson’s Eumenthol Jujubes is a case in point. The 
promoters of this product capitalised on health trends by changing their rhetoric 
accordingly: in March 1918 they were touted as a “great antiseptic and prophylactic” 
aiding indigestion and dyspepsia. In May, they became useful for “coughs, colds, sore 
throats, bronchitis, influenza, and the prevention of consumption”.70 By September, the 
jujubes were not only useful for the aforementioned problems, they were now also  
 
recommended by the Medical World, viz:– The Lancet, The 
Australasian Medical Gazette, The Practitioner, Medical Press 




The benefits of other products such as Parker’s Treble Distilled Eucalyptus Oil were also 
promoted as “the best remedy and preventative against influenza”.72 These claims are 
bombastic, but they reflect a want for curative options beyond those routinely prescribed 
in hospitals. We can also see this desire for medicines in the way influenza profiteering 
was occurring – the price of medicines went up “by leaps and bounds” and dispensaries 
were accused of “charging exorbitant prices” at the height of the outbreak.73  
 
For the most part, the brunt of the pandemic was borne by the Asian inhabitants 
of Singapore. Mathematically, this would be the logical conclusion since Europeans only 
made up around two per cent of the population. However, the death rate amongst 
Asians was always considerably higher than their European counterparts. In 1918, the 
death rate for Europeans in the General Hospital was 4.89; the figure for Asians was 
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 13.01.74 To a large extent, the impact amongst the diverse Asian inhabitants in Singapore 
has to be envisioned based on what lacunae exist in the archives. The English-language 
newspapers are less helpful because they catered to an European and English-educated 
audience.75 The experiences of the bulk of the population remain registered as statistics 
because only the deaths of the more prominent Europeans and locals were reported. 
That said, official government reports and newspaper articles about Penang, Malacca, 
and Peninsula Malaya offer good suggestions on what the impact and response was like 
at the ground in Singapore.  
 
1918 was an especially bad year for those who were poor because it was marked 
by rice shortages and increased food prices. For rickshaw coolies, who make up some of 
the poorest sections of society, their wages had fallen at least 20 per cent behind the 
rising cost of living in 1918.76 In addition to these difficulties, overcrowding was a big 
problem in the town areas because housing did not keep up with population growth. 
Overcrowded houses, in which scores of coolies and whole families nested cheek-by-
jowl, would have offered “unrivalled facilities” for infectious diseases like influenza to 
spread. Although there was no known cure for the flu at the time, medical authorities 
were nonetheless aware that nourishing food, care, and plenty of bed rest could be 
surprisingly effective.77 For someone like a rickshaw coolie, however, a nutritious diet 
and plenty of rest was an unattainable luxury. Getting the flu would mean forgoing a few 
days of precious income at best; for those who suffered more serious pneumonic 
complications, death could come graphically and swiftly. Whether they were rich or less 
well off, many Asians who were ill preferred to stay at home and resort to their own 
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 cures. Some took to carrying pieces of camphor in their pockets as a form of 
disinfectant.78 However, when bed rest, divinations, and homemade remedies failed, 
some made their way to the hospitals as a last resort. Unfortunately, many of these cases 
were admitted in the last stages of pneumonia and “little could be done for them”.79  
 
Historically, periods of epidemic crisis in Singapore have incited various religious 
responses. Cholera was especially feared and major outbreaks were marked by “a great 
number of Chinese processions and the vast amount of cracker firing”.80 To many 
people, the Great Flu also elicited similar reactions. Although the flu may not be as 
terrifying as cholera, it should be remembered that the 1918 strain could be a striking 
one. Those who thought they were suffering from malarial fever would have been 
surprised by the suddenness and virulence for which the Great Flu was known. The 
onset was unexpected and people could collapse abruptly or become delirious. 
Consequently, for many in Malaya the epidemic was a source of fear and was rationalised 
in supernatural terms. In Pahang, for example, some attributed the outbreak “to the evil 
influence of earth spirits and ‘djinns’, and prayers, incantations and offerings” were seen 
as far more beneficial than disinfection and quarantine. Muslims in Klang gathered in the 
mosque for one week to hold special prayers due to the epidemic.81 
 
In the Straits Settlements, the British reported a wang kang ceremony in Malacca 
where a small boat was built and burnt in order to propitiate the deity responsible for the 
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 1918 flu.82 The Hindus in Penang planned for the Goddess Mariamman to be taken in 
procession around town on account of the outbreak.83 In light of these reports, the 
probability of many Asian inhabitants in Singapore responding to the epidemic through 
spiritual recourse is high. Even though there do not seem to be any reports of major 
processions or gatherings in Singapore, disease and medicine were connected in a much 
more wholistic manner than in the Western scientific rationalisation. As discussed in 




Remembering the 1918 Flu: Consequences on State and Public 
 
 
Despite its dense population and connection to global trade routes, Singapore 
somehow escaped the havoc that was seen in other parts of Malaya and the world. Lee et. 
al. also highlight that unlike global patterns, there was no third epidemic wave in 
Singapore.84 Furthermore, the outbreak did not seem to have any major consequences on 
population growth. Certainly, the overall impact is comparatively small if we judge solely 
by the numbers. The reality, however, is more complex. Firstly, while population 
reportedly grew by 23.7 per cent since 1911, it was due in most part to the increase in 
Chinese women migrating to Singapore.85 As Manderson points out, population needs 
were met “through immigration rather than natural increase” whenever the economy 
expanded and “as each new cohort of immigrants was culled by parasitic infection and 
death”.86 Secondly, even though there was apparently no third wave, influenza was still 
listed as a principal cause of death in 1919. The following year, the flu sufficiently raised 
the death rate to prompt authorities to move another special vote of $10,000 to “meet 
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 expenses of preventive measures against an Influenza Epidemic”. The disease was also 
said to be still lingering on in 1921.87  
 
The impact can also be glimpsed when we see how the outbreak is remembered. 
In the 1920s, there were strong appeals to address the issue of malaria and the Great Flu 
was evoked in order to highlight the seriousness of the former disease. According to one 
letter to the Straits Times in 1923, “[few would] have forgotten the great epidemic of 
influenza in 1918, when sickness and death seemed to reign supreme”.88 Thus, even if the 
flu “did not at any time give cause for alarm” to the state, it was still a disease that made 
its mark on the public.89 In the absence of substantial records, we can only imagine the 
impression that the flu had on most of the population. The way in which the deaths of 
only the richer or more significant people were reported in the newspapers is a reflection 
of class as well as ideological values that exist within the colonial regime. For the poorest 
and those who lived outside of the Municipal areas, their stories remain unmarked and 
lost. It is only in the details that some sense of the times can be inferred. For example, 
when we consider how there were no less that 98 burials at Bidadari cemetery alone 
during the peak of the epidemic, we can begin to speculate on the level of loss 
experienced at the individual and community levels.90  
  
While authorities felt they could “congratulate themselves that [the flu] had not 
been so bad in Singapore as in some of the other towns in the Peninsula”, the 
comparatively small impact was not on account of British preparedness, Western 
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 scientific medicine, or the strength of the medical facilities.91 The 1918 influenza 
pandemic is “no subject for a triumphalist medical history” because it disrupts the hubris 
of Western medicine, reveals the inadequacies of the colonial biomedical infrastructure, 
and lays bare the chief concerns of the imperial agenda in its colonies.92 The British 
recognised that they had a responsibility for dealing with infectious disease but their 
sense of obligation was coloured by the realities of economic gain and the relationship 
between state control, medicine, and sickness. Therefore, while municipal commissioners 
were acutely aware that medical facilities in Singapore were disproportionate to the size 
of its population and insufficient to deal with any major epidemic outbreak, the reality 
was that the colonial government had its own vested interests. During periods of crisis 
such as war, public health expenditure was something that could be sacrificed until the 
political and economic situation stabilised. As the Governor admitted, it is in “the matter 
of public health that the whole of Malaya has been hardest hit by the war”.93 
 
Whenever Singapore is discussed in official documents, newspapers, memoirs, 
and essays, its economic significance as a port city is always highlighted. It is plainly 
noted that “[as] a shipping port Singapore lives or dies”.94 Disease, medicine, and health 
were intimately intertwined and crucial for sustaining the desired level of commercial 
success that the British expected. The 1918 influenza pandemic demonstrated, however, 
that the British were only willing to safeguard the health of its inhabitants insofar as 
trade, commerce, and the political regime were protected. In the final analysis, the impact 
of the 1918 flu in Singapore was not great; the outbreak did not detract greatly from the 
colonial government’s cultural and ideological paradigms about influenza and disease, 
and neither did it greatly challenge the status quo. However, while the general lack of 
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 records suggest that the socio-cultural impact was not devastating, we can only imagine 
the confusion and loss experienced at the ground level. Although the world had simply 
“grown accustomed to the presence of a certain amount of influenza in its midst”, after 
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As “one of the world’s most potent phobias”, disease has inspired both fear and 
the means with which to address that anxiety.1 By basing this thesis on the premise that 
medicine is cognition and behaviour, we have been able to investigate the ways in which 
ideas about health and disease have evolved to influence the practice of medicine.2 One 
of the main aims of this thesis is to historicise the attitudes towards influenza in order to 
achieve a more nuanced understanding of the Spanish Flu and its impact. Influenza killed 
more people than cholera in the nineteenth century but since its mortality was confined 
to the elderly, its reputation as a horrid but not terribly dangerous infection was 
maintained.3 As Rosenberg wrote, the flu is “too easily transmitted, too universal, and 
insufficiently lethal or disfiguring”.4 Divorced from occult and astral causations, and 
aided by medical advances, Europeans began to see influenza as something they could 
more definitely control. In this way, interest in the flu as a serious disease began to 
weaken among the medical profession at the turn of the twentieth century.  
 
 These attitudes towards influenza powerfully shaped the state’s and medical 
fraternity’s actions, which in turn affected the public’s ability to cope during the 
outbreak. In Chapter One, we tracked the history of influenza in the West and how the 
appraisal of the disease changed alongside the professionalisation of medicine in Britain. 
The growing institutional power of medicine in universities and hospitals led to 
increasing confidence in Western medicine, but this faith was not always buttressed by 
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 actual curative prowess. The Great Flu effectively exposed the limitations of scientific 
medicine and the confusion amongst its practitioners. It also revealed the inertia of a 
government that was too preoccupied with the war. As we saw in the last chapter, the 
lukewarm response in Whitehall was not confined to Britain alone. In Singapore, 
influenza had to compete with other diseases like plague, beri-beri, malaria, cholera, and 
smallpox for importance. Compared to the flu, the cultural memory and economic cost 
of diseases like bubonic plague or smallpox were more potent in jostling the authorities 
into action. The comparison made in Chapter Three between responses during the 
Russian Flu in 1890 against 1918 also demonstrate how sanitary control became part of 
the state’s medical involvement, thus signalling a new logic towards the management of 
disease that had also become prominent in the metropole. 
 
The 1918-1919 flu outbreak also provides the context for assessing the medical 
cultures in two societies and to re-appraise the confidence in Western scientific medicine. 
Until the long-time disjunction between medical theory and curative capability was 
bridged in the 1950s, popular methods of treating diseases like cholera actually hastened 
the deaths of its victims, and vaccines that could prove effective against influenza were 
still a distant dream.5 As such, while we should avoid crude and anachronistic judgements 
of medicine in the past, Western medical history was not marked by unilinear triumphs 
of progress involving ‘orthodox’ doctors alone. Furthermore, much of the healing in the 
past “has been primarily a tale of medical self-help, or community care”, where 
professional practitioners were only marginally involved.6 In the colonial context, 
Western medicine is also shown to be less socio-culturally and ideologically prevailing 
than doctors and administrators would have hoped. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
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 practice of imperial medicine was complicated by two issues: firstly, tropical medicine 
was not always as effective as the colonial rhetoric made it out to be; secondly, the 
British were entering a medical landscape with its own pre-existing mores that were long-
established and marked by great diversity. In spite of the increasingly intrusiveness of the 
colonial medical apparatus, non-European doctors, bomohs, and Chinese freelance 
physicians continued to fluorish and occupy positions of critical importance to their 
respective communities.  
 
We have also explored the issue of control and the dynamic power relationships 
shared among healthcare providers, its regulators, as well as its consumers. Chapter One 
investigated the rise of the British medical profession but pointed out that allopathic 
doctors did not enjoy a monopoly even as they grew increasingly in visibility and 
prestige. The Great Flu provided the medical fraternity with a catalyst for medical 
reform. Plans for a Ministry of Health that were stalled by World War One now gained 
the necessary impetus and were championed by the British medical elite, who were eager 
to consolidate their position within the upper echelons of political power. Although the 
1918 pandemic thwarted the efforts of the British medical fraternity to control the 
disease, it nonetheless strengthened their belief in the importance of scientific, preventive 
medicine.  
 
In Chapter Two, power and control were discussed in another context. Here, 
medicine is shown to be a potent expression of Western dominance associated with the 
colonial regime. New ideas about disease and health helped to justify colonisation and 
the spread of Western medical institutions and practices in its possessions overseas. 
Medicine is shown to operate within a nexus of complex articulations about knowledge, 
power, culture, economics, and ethnicity. The powerful combination of racism and the 
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 motives of the colonial political economy often meant avoiding the importance of 
grinding poverty and malnutrition on ill health. It also meant providing substandard 
medical services, preferring to focus on sanitation policies instead. As Manderson argued: 
 
[healthcare] and medical services, sanitation measures 
and their enforcement, immunisation programs and 
public health education were developed and 
implemented in ways that were influenced by the forces 
of the political economy and the moral logic of 
colonialism, in turn informed by understandings of race, 
sex, health and disease.7 
 
 
In the final analysis, we see how medicine is really a “social response” towards 
the age-old relationship we have shared with disease.8 Faced with the inevitable, people 
have had to find different ways of rationalising why we get sick and to make systemic 
changes to understand, cope with, and cure illness. Medicine is therefore a way of 
ordering the world. In the process of the new attitudes and programmes that arose as a 
consequence of travel, colonialism, industrialisation, and capitalism, the relationships 
between idea and practice, state and society, as well as public and profession, have 
evolved as well. As Rosenberg points out, every level of medical cognition and 
interaction is necessarily social, often ideological, and with the ascendance of Western 
scientific medicine, marked by increasingly unequal power relations.9  
 
This thesis has shown that these ideas and interactions were far from static – they 
involved various groups of society that were invariably engaged with each other in co-
operation, tension, acceptance, resistance, and bemusement. Hans Zinsser reminds us 
that the historical study of infectious disease must “take into account the fact that 
parasitic adaptations are not static” because “extraordinarily slight changes in mutual 
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 adjustment between parasite and host may profoundly alter clinical and epidemiological 
manifestations”.10 In a similar vein, the historical study of disease needs to accommodate 
the dynamic natures of epidemiological adaptations as well as ideological, institutional, 
and cultural ones. Periods of great stress, as in epidemics, provide a useful context for 
testing the values and innovations that a society has made in the name of health and 
progress by exposing and amplifying the worldviews that structure social relationships. 
 
This project contributes to the historiography of the Great Flu by grappling with 
the way influenza is dismissed in spite of its ability to “arouse terror as the last great 
plague of man”.11 Influenza epidemiology and the issues of power and control in relation 
to medicine remain significant today. As evidenced with the recent outbreaks of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and H1N1, infectious diseases have great 
contemporary relevancy in the twenty-first century and represent a reality check for any 
blind faith in medical science. Global transportation systems, the burgeoning world 
population, industrial farming, and increasingly dense megalopoli provide diseases with 
more chances of spreading, thereby challenging our ability to manage any epidemic fall-
out and differentiating between countries and communities who have the resources to 
cope with pandemics.12 The drama and complexities of the Great Flu opens a window 
into late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain and Singapore and provides us 
with a means of venturing beyond the purely epidemiological to understand what people 
thought of sickness and health, how they coped with pain and trauma, how they lived 
and, consequently, how they died.  
 
* 
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